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INTRODUCTION

After Germany declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941,
Allied military strategists decided to give priority to the defeat of Hitler's forces
which had already overrun most of Europe. But before the Allies were to build
up a force strong enough to cross the English Channel and establish a front on
land against Germany, the American Army Air Force (AAF) joined the British
Royal Air Force (RAF) in the already raging air war against German dominated
Europe. The strategic goal for the Allied air campaign was

finalized at the

Casablanca Conference, in January 1943. According to the adopted

policy

statement, called the

Force

Combined Bomber Offensivethe US Army Air

and the RAF were to use their air strength for the "progressive destruction and
dislocation of the enemy's war industrial and economic system and the
undermining of his morale to a point where his capacity for armed resistance is
fatally weakened."2
After the Allied invasion of Italy which began with a landing on Sicily on
July 10, 1943, the Americans moved a part of their flying force to Italy, in order
to facilitate

a more efficient bombing of Austria and parts of Eastern Europe

from the South, rather than

from across the English Channel. The American

15th Army Air Force was officially

created on November 1, 1943.3 Under the

command of General Spaatz, it was assigned the task of the bombing of Austria
1

Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences a' Washington. 1941-1942. and
Casablanca. 1943. fWashington: U.S. Government Printing Office,1968), p 746.
2
Ibid.
3
Buchanan A. Russell, The United States & World War II. Vol. I. (New York: Harper &
Row, 1964), p 209.
1

and parts of Eastern Europe/

HeadquartefS were set up in Bari, Italy, and

planes began to fly out of Foggia International Airport.5
In July 1944, after D-Day, the British Air Ministry formulated proposals for
speeding up the end of

the war through "aerial terror raids." A proposal

document contained suggestions for the bombing of small towns, raids on
larger cities, and the strafing

of roads and railroads.6 A copy was sent to

Washington; after analysis, the American General Laurence Kuter, the Assistam
Chief of Air Staff for planning, contended

that it was "contrary to our national

ideals to wage war against civilians," but Genera! Henry ("Hap") Arnold, his
superior, came out in favor of it and proposed strafing and bombing of
populated areas, believing the sight of Allied aircraft flying over Germany would
"deepen the [Germans'] feelings of hopelessness."7 By that time, major German
cities, such as Hamburg and Berlin,

had already been extensively bomced,

mostly by the RAF's massive use of "precision bombing" at night.8
Even though moral considerations were concerns in the discussion on
the

adoption of a bombing plan, as well as worries about public opinion,

this point

at

the U.S. rejected the British concept in favor of "strategic

bombardment," a concept already accepted in January 1943 by the American
Army Air Force.

It was argued that "strategic bombardment"

would play an

important part in the final defeat of the enemy.9 The official intent was "to cause
disruption of the enemy's war effort by bombarding vitally important industrial
'"Ronald Schafter. Winas of Judgment. American Bombing in WWII (New York/Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985), p 38.
1
Claude Parker, Cuckoo over Vienna (Traverse City: Village Press, 1989), p 27.
'Judgment, pp 80-81.
7
Ibid.
' i.e. the bombing of specific military and economic targets. (Strategic bombirg = bombing of
urban areas with a long-range aim of disrupting the German economy ) Judgment, pp. 35-38.
8
Judgment, pp 80-81.
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installations, and destroying specific targets, thereby breaking down the fighting
ability and

morale of the enemy."10 Thereupon

American bombing of Vienna

and other parts of Austria, (annexed to the Reich in 1938,) began in earnest.
Before regular bombing began, there had been two previous isolated
incidents. The first was the bombing of the Messerschmitt factory, in August
1943. This factory in Wiener Neustadt, about 25 miles south of Vienna,
produced

single-engine fighter aircraft. The second consisted of an attack on

Vienna itself, in January 1944. Following two more attacks in
1944, regular bombing of Vienna began in September

the spring of

1944 and increased in

the following months. When the attacks ceased in April

1945, following the

Soviet capture of the city, the population had endured a total of 110 air attacks,
215 hours and 30 minutes in duration,
civilians."

and causing the deaths of 8769

The Americans used most often general purpose (GP) bombs of

either 227 or 454 kilograms of weight, containing 51% explosives, and
demolition bombs, with 60% explosives.12
The

American

bombing presented

a new challenge

government as well as the city population who found themselves
already in the dire circumstances of a 5-year war.13

for the city
ensconced

The city government,

stripped of its pre-Anschluss officials, consisted of dedicated National Socialist
party members from
10

Germany proper who spouted Nazi philosophy in all their

Ibid.
All statistics of Vienna air attacks from: Official Statistics of Frequency and Results of
Bombinc. as reported by the Chief of the Statistics Office of the Crty of Vienna, Dr. Karl Pospischil
in the collection Reports of private persons (survivors.') (Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/83--1-3,
part 1, folder 1, and VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44.), Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (City Archives).
12
Heeresgeschichtliches'Museum, (Museum of Military History) Vienna, 1994 exhibrtior.
"Walkuere und der Totenwald. Das Kriegsjahr 1944," display item with description.
13
The British, except for minor sporadic incidents earlier in the Austrian provinces, did not get
involved in the bombardment of Vienna; it fell therefore to the Americans to direct their bombing
power towards the city.
n
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endeavors, but needed the cooperation of the population, not only in the quest
for winning the war, but also to survive. Viennese citizens, coping with every¬
day deprivation and struggling to survive, had to rely ever more on the heip of
the government and its aid programs in order to exist. The bombing seemed to
bring out their resilience and a determination to pursue their normal day-to-day
life as much as possible until the end of the war.
While various aspects of WWII, including American bombing missions,
have been treated and analyzed, the bombing of Vienna and its impact on the
population has escaped major attention, especially in

English-language

literature. It is the intent of this thesis to trace the history of the 1944-1945
bombing of Vienna and the response of the government and the population to
this ordeal.

CHAPTER !: THE AIR ATTACKS

Vienna experienced the full-fledged air war only from September 1944 to
April 1945, but then in all its severity in terms of the destruction of housing and
lost lives, as well as the destruction of major cultural monuments. The inclusion
of Austria in the air war (--only Germany proper

had been bombed so far-)

followed from a number of factors:14
By 1944, Austria had become integrated into the Nazi war effort. Because
of the bombing of her war production facilities, Germany transferred some of
her war-related production to Austria, which had become labeled as "the air raid
shelter of the Reich." Small Austrian factories were also built into bigger ones,
making Austria more inviting as a target.
The Allies recognized the geographical position of Austria between Italy
ana the rest of Germany, as well as

its role as a

gateway io southeastern

Europe as strategically important. Railway lines from Germany to these areas
went through Austria. Fresh supplies, troops and ammunition
Eastern (Balkan)

fronts were transported

for the South-

through Austria. The Danube river,

which went through Austria and Vienna, served as the most important inner
waterway for the shipment

of Rumanian oil into Germany. After the Allied

conquest of Southern Italy and the establishment of Allied air bases there,
Austna became vulnerable to Allied air attacks from the south and a prime
military target. The important war-related facilities in Austria were:

" Johann Ulrich. Per Luftkriea ueber Oesterreich 1939-1945 (Vienna: Oesterreichischer
Bundesverlag fuer Unterricht. Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1967), pp 1-7.
5

6

(1) airplane factories
in Wiener Neustadt (--the Messerschmitt plant, together with the facility in
Regensburg, produced 48% of all German single-engine airplanes-),
in Schwechat (about 6 miles outside of Vienna,) and Klagenfurt (in the
province of Carinthia,)
(2) steel, chemical and fuel plants
particularly the oilfields in Zistersdorf (province of Lower Austria),
refineries in Vienna-Floridsdorf and other districts cn the periphery of
Vienna,
(3) transportation factories
such as the Steyr-Daimler-Puch truck manufacturing plan;: in
Vienna, Wiener Neustadt and Steyr (Upper Austria), and the
"Hermann Goering" Panzer factory in Linz.'5

The bombing of industrial targets

were highlighted by an attack on

Wiener Neustadt in August of 1943. The air raid concentrated on
Neustadt, because it
factory in the country,

Wiener

contained the only significant Messerschmitt airplane
it has been

estimated that between 1943-1945, the

whole town was 88% destroyed.16
Sporadic air attacks on Vienna started in September of 1943

and

increased in frequency and intensity as the war progressed.17 In January 1944.

15

Today the state-subsidized Austrian steel plant, "VOEST."
Per Luftkrieq. p 6-7.
7
' "Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/83--1-3", part 1, folder 1: "Berichte von privaten Personen
("Reports of Private Persons",) Official Statistics of Frequency and Results of Bombing. City
Archives.
15

7
only one took place, with no fatalities; there were two attacks in April, killing 161
people. Air attacks increased in number with thirteen in

December, which

lasted altogether 29 hours, 33 minutes and caused 347 fatalities. For the entire
year 1944, the total number of air attacks was 63; the attacks lasted 103 hours,
43 minutes, and

4,175 people

were killed. The course of daily life in Vienna

was interrupted every second or third day.
In 1945,

the number of attacks

place, lasting 54 hours and 31 minutes;
accurate statistics could

increased. In March, 17 attacks took
1,526 civilians were killed. By April,

no longer be kept because of widespread confusion

and chaos, capped by heavy fighting in the streets, as
Vienna from the east

the Soviets

and the bureaucracy ceased to function.

attacked

Though the

end of the war was clearly in sight, by March 1945 air attacks on Vienna took
place daily and nightly until April 9. On April 13, 1945, the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian
Army under Marshall Tolbukhin captured Vienna.16 Bombing of other parts of
Austria

lasted until April 29, when capitulation on the Southern front was

announced and a new Austrian government was formed. In 1945, from January
until the first part of April, 41 attacks lasting 101 hours and 30 minutes took
place, and 4594 fatalities were

recorded. If the single attacks from

1943 are

also counted, the number of air raids on Vienna during the war totaled

110,

their duration was 215 hours and 30 minutes, and 8769 civilians were killed/9
Two hundred and fifteen total hours of actual bombing time may seem
little

when measured against a certain time frame, but how deeply the air

attacks became imprinted on the minds of the frightened people who fled into

16

Hi inh Trpvnr-Roper ed. Final Entries. 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels (New York:
Avon, 1979) , p 417.
14
Per Luftkriea. pp 30-31.
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the shelters can only be imagined; an examination of the statistics of a single
day may highlight the destruction of an average bombardment:
The Air Defense Damage Report of June 16, 1944, of an attack on the
Vienna suburb of Floridsdorf, a peripheral district with some heavy industry as
well as housing, was
Gotzmann.23

compiled

by the Vienna Chief of Police himself, Herr

This document, originally stamped "classified," assessed

damages and accounted for people's lives:

Loss of life :

209

Wounded:

1239

Houses hit:
Totally destroyed:

895
57

Heavily damaged:

107

Medium damage

122

Light damage

609

Count of bombs

774

Public buildings hit:
railway station Floridsdorf

20
21

(1 incendiary bomb)

public bath Floridsdorf

(3 incendiary bombs)

public pawn shop

(5 incendiary bombs)

Office of Health

(2 incendiary bombs)

NSV2" Headquarters

(6 incendiary bombs)

"Kleine Bestaende" Gruppe VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44, City Archives.
NSV = Nationalsozialistische Volks Wohlfahrt (National Socialistic Peoples' Welfare.)

9

Additional targets hit: Reich railroad premises,
street cars, tracks and
overhead wires,
electric-, gas-, and water
works.

If the number of 209 people killed by the bombing seems high, it must be
pointed out that this attack was only one of the earlier, smaller ones. The
heaviest air attack took place on March 12, 1945, in which not only 925 people
perished and lost their homes but, in addition, numerous industrial as well as
cultural buildings were hit.2
On that day, according to Goebbels' diary, as many as

550 American

four-engined bombers from Italy raided Vienna.3 A later Austrian account
reports 747 bombers (225 B-17 and 522 B-24) and calls the mission the biggest
single operation of the 15th AAF. 1,667 tons of bombs were thrown
refinery in Vienna-Floridsdorf.* An

American

at the oil

account for that day, though,

reports otherwise:3
"12 March: Fifteenth AF: 90 B-24's and B-17's bomb Vienna/Floridsdorf
oil refinery and alternate tgts of Graz, . . . Bad weather forces 60 P-51's sent
against Austrian comm [communications] to abort."

""Kieine Bestaende" Gruppe VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44, City Archives.
"Final Entries, p. 147. (Goebbels' account of statistical figures stem from government
reports.)
" Per Luftkrieq. p 29.
" Kit. C. Carter and Robert Mueller, Combat Chronology 1941 - 1945 (Washington, DC:
Center for Air Force History,1991), p 597. According to its foreword, (p III) the Combat
Chronology "is a factual record of combat operations conducted by the United States Army Air
Forces during World War II. No attempt has been made to interrelate the events."

10
The

second-heaviest attack was recorded on Feb 21,1945, with 849

fatalities, and the third-heaviest on Sep 10,1944, with 776 fatalities.26

Again,

there is only laconic acknowledgment in American sources:27
"10 September: Fifteenth AF: 344 B-17's and B-24's bomb 5 crdlnance
depots and SE industrial area in Vienna and 2 oil refineries in the area."
Compared with the great amount of damage and destruction of buildings,
the loss of human life was, in hindsight relatively small. If we take into account
that 110 air attacks took place during the 1944-1945 period, the loss of iess than
9000 lives

is not excessive.

following explanations

The Chief of the Statistical Office offered the

for relatively high survival rates

of the Viennese

population:28

(1) An enforced building code
Details had been well-thought-out; for example, wooden stairwells were
not allowed; roofs had to be separated from the top floor.
(2) Height of buildings
Since, statistically, rural districts of Vienna had heavier losses, it was
assumed that the height and multiplicity of stories in the apartment
buildings contributed to survival. Often the bombs did not penetrate to
the basement.

i6

"Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44, City Archives.
Cornbal Chronology, p 447.
26;
'Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/83--1-3: "Reports of private persons," City Archives
27
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(3) Adherence to rules
Strict adherence to the rules, which became law," such as descending to
basements as well as all the other rules of self-protection, contributed to
survival and in the end justified themselves.
4) Indoctrination and acceptance of authority
Playing on ready acceptance of higher authority by the populace, Nazi
indoctrination turned out to be helpful for the implementation and
acceptance of the strict ruies of air protection

and played a major role

in upholding the morale of the people and their ultimate survival.
(5) A professional fire department
Founded in 1686, it had a long tradition of prompt arrival at the stricken
place. Stations were located in parts of the city in such a way that under
most circumstances, the first vehicle was able to arrive- at its destination
within five minutes of notification."
6) Fewer fire bombs dropped
Major surface fires, like the ones in German cities, did not take place
because Vienna was spared, except for a few instances, the fire
bombing that ravaged some German cites.31
For example, on the night of July 24/25, 1943, the British attacked
Hamburg with 700 aircraft, resulting in firestorms.® Again, on July 29/30, the city

" The Air Defense Law went into effect September 1, 1939. ( It will be highlighted in the
next chapter.)
30
Referat FD4, Berufsfeuerwehr der Stadt Wien (Mayl1994) : 12. This particular fact is
confirmed by (he historian of the the Vienna Fire Department, Helmut Bouzek. ( Personal
Interview with Helmut Bouzek. August 1994.)
31
Ibid. Also: Hugo Portisch & Sepp Riff, Oesterreich II: Der lanoe Weq zur Freiheit (Vienna:
Kremayrand Scheriau, 1985) , p 46. "A particular reason," says historian Helmut Bouzek "why
there were fewer fire bombs used than in German cities, was never found; it's just a fact."
32
Peter Young, A Short History of World War II 1939-1945 (New York: Crowel!, 1966), pp 2612.
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was bombed and from an economic point of view was now practically "knocked
out." Nearly a million inhabitants fled, 40,000 died and about the same number
were injured, all by

7,196 tons of bombs. What made the devastation so

complete, again,

were the types of bombs utilized: high capacity bombs, high

explosives

incendiary

and

bombs,

capable

of

starting

uncontrollable fires. In another case of the usage of incendiary

terrible

and

bombs, on

February 3,1945, in only one attack on Berlin, 25,000 civilians lost their lives.
Answering widespread protests, Allied Air Force leaders insisted that they were
not conducting terror warfare, but striking legitimate military objectives such as
rail centers.33
The reasons for the "better treatment" of Austria in comparison with the
German cities have never been defined. In 1942 alone, whiie Austria was still
considered a safe haven, 41,400 tons of bombs nad been already dropped on
Germany; and by October 1942, the number of civilians' death stood at 10,900,
according to Goebbels' reports.34 One cannot help but think that an element of
revenge was involved on the part of the Allies. Germany, after ail, had instigated
the war and had furthermore bombed England.
Statistics of London which suffered the September 1940-May 1941
"Blitz"-bombing attacks of the Nazi Luftwaffe, reveal that up to November 13th,
1940, an average of 160 bombs were dropped daily with an average of 200
tons of high explosives, while 182 canisters of incendiaries were disposed of
nightly.35
33

On October 15th, there were 410 planes over London, and they

One reason for this particular Berlin raid had been the understanding that the German Sixth
Panzer Army was moving through Berlin on its way from the Western to the Eastern front.
"Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1977), p
167.
35
Angus Caider.The People's War, Britain-1939-1945 (New York:Pantheon Books, 1969), p
168.
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dropped 538 tons of high explosives, causing more than 25,000 casualties;
over 900 fires were started. From the beginning of September 1940 to mid-May
1941, German bombardiers killed nearly 40,000 people in London, Coventry,
and other urban centers, and destroyed the homes of many thousands more.
Not only did Vienna's population survive with somewhat fewer casualties
than those of other large cities, it also was better protected than the citizens of
other Austrian cities. This

can be demonstrated by

comparing the

ratio

of

victims in Vienna with those of other Austrian cities:36

PER 1000 INHABITANTS KILLED
in Vienna:

5

Wr. Neustadt: 25
Attnang Puchheim37

The Nazi

203

system of civil air raid defense contributed greatly to the

citizens' survival. Although civil defense could not prevent material destruction,
it did maintain order until the end and prevented chaos.

36
37

Oesterreich II. p 47.
An important railroad connection point.

CHAPTER 2: AIR DEFENSE

Only stupid people will disregard air protection.38 Only stupid
people will not understand the high goal of air protection. A
recognized danger is only half a danger. Man has always
overcome any danger, no matter what kind, if his will remained
unshakable.®

The Reich Minister of Defense and Aviation, Hermann Goering,

well

aware that "regardless of how large we built the German Luftwaffe, it won't be
enough to provide real protection to the population and to protect them entirely
from the consequences of an air attack," created, nevertheless, a most
organized and effective program of air protection for the population.*5
The Air Defense
The Air Defense

Law
Law was the umbrella law, which regulated the goals

and execution of air protection for both the military and the civilians.11 (Only the
latter will be discussed here.) The law was so detailed that it provided for
appropriate behavior in almost every situation and contained sublaws for even
the most minor matters. Air defense was to be, according to the official
definition, the sum of all means which the national government used "for the
protection of Volk and Reich against enemy air attacks." In Vienna, the laws and
34

Note: the original German word, used in documents, is "L.uftschutz," which literally means
"air protection," but the word "air defense," literally meaning "Luftverteidigung" in German, is
commonly used in American literature.
38

Hermann Goering, Berlin Sports Palace, 1935, according to Prologue of Luftschutz
brochure, Box 1942/1, Archives of the Vienna Police Headquarters.
40
Ibid.
" Reichsgesetzbiatt - RGBI. I s.1631, September 1,1939, Box 1942/1, Police Archives
14
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regulations were published in a series of ReichsgesetzbiaeUer (RGBI).42 They
were reiterated by the highest political authority in Vienna, the Reichssiatthaiter,
Baldur von Schirach, and repeated, explained and interpreted in additional
executive orders, directives and memos, all published in the Amtsblaetter
(A.BI.)43 Obedience to regulations was reinforced by all means of
propaganda. The police as the enforcer of

proper procedures

Reich

maintained

order, even under the heaviest bombardment. Included in the Air Defense Law
were

extensive systems of air defense strategy14 as well as civilian air

protection/^The air defense consisted of:

(1) the flight-reporting service -- "Flugmeldedienst" (FMD),
(2) the air defense warning service -- "Luftschutzwarndienst"
(LSD),
(3) the execution of military defense - "Abwehr."

The civilian air protection consisted of:

(1) operation of air shelters,
(2) regulations pertaining to "rules of behavior in shelters,"
(3) relief programs.

<2

State legal pamphlets.
"Official pamphlets.
" Box 1942/1, Archives of the Police Headquarters.
45
Ibid.

16
Air Defense strategy
FMD and LSD
The FMD cooperated with the LSD by transmitting news and sightings to
the LSD which in turn notified a string of official institutions as well as the
civilian population by means of three warning signals: "air danger alert," "air
attack alarm," "air danger over."
At "Air danger," the population was warned through the radioby the tone
of a cuckoo --a sound that became infamous--, which interrupted regular
programming.46 It meant that enemy airplanes had become airborne from their
stations in Italy and could reach the city in about 20 minutes. If the planes did
not approach Austria, the signal was cleared and regular programming
resumed, but if the planes indeed continued on towards Austria, the next phase
took place:
The signal of "Air attack alarm" was indicated through a consistent upand-down wailing tone that emerged from the public address system, installed
all over town, and summoned the population to seek shelter.
the

At the same time,

regular radio program went off the air and wire service began to report

progressively on the "air situation."47 Anyone interested could follow the reports
on the "air situation map," a copy of which was distributed to each household.
On it, the city of Vienna with its
numbered
service,

sections,

surrounding territory was

divided

into

and the numbers, continually announced over the wire

would inform the listeners of the sections over which the air planes

were flying.
46

Hitler had advocated that every household be in possession of an uniform black box, called
the "Volksempfaenger," -- "the people's radio receiver," which was mass-produced and affordable
for everyone.
"Thomas Chorherr, Wien. Die Geschichte einer Weltstadt im Heldenzeitalter (Vienna:
Ueberreuter, 1987), p 294.
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When the "Air danger" was over,
the attacks had ceased and

a consistent even tone signified that

assured the population that it was safe again to

leave the shelters and return to their dwellings or work.

Military defense - Abwehr
By the end of January 1944, one could question the effectiveness of the
German Luftwaffe, and by March 1944, the Allies

considered the Germans to

have lost the air war for good.48 In Austria, there was practically no air defense
by means of air fighters.49 When Wiener Neustadt was heavily and surprisingly
bombed, on August 13th, 1943, (--the air raid warning system was then still
inadequate--) there existed only two small airports, one in Voeslau, just outside
of Vienna, with only one "Jagdverband"- (fighter squadron) and one in Pels am
Wagram. The situation of the Luftwaffe was dismal.®
In addition, that same year air plane factories were hit and thus cut down
on defensive capability. In Wiener Neustadt, tor example, 180 completed
Jaegers were totally destroyed; the Heinckel-Nachtjaeger factory in Heidfeld at
Schwechat and Zwoelfaxing (a few miles southeast of Vienna) was disabled;
and even substitute underground facilities such as the Goettweig monastery's
cellar and several wine cellars in Lower Austria, used for the production of
airplane parts, were hit and rendered unusable. Finally, the bombing

of the

'9 The United States arvi Worid War II. pp 209-212 (This was at the time the opnion of the
Allies.)
Per Luftkriea. p 8.
"Norbert Schausberger, Ruestunq in Oesterreich 1938-1945 (Vienna: Brueder
Ho!!inek,1Q70), pp 148-50.
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Research Center on Flying in Vienna-Floridsdorf
saw

the beginning of

attacks on

on June 16

and 26, 1944,

small and medium Vienna firms which

manufactured armament products.5'
One of the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Luftwaffe was the
Allies' realization that they could keep
ground by

the enemy aircraft permanently on the

targeting German fuel resources.

On June 8th, 1944, the Allies

made destruction of German oi! production officially a top-priority goal;52

and

even though the production of German aircraft actually increased during the
remainder of the year, some of it could not be used. A shortage of trained pilots
existed

because, paradoxically, pilots in

training had to conserve fuel

which

was in short supply because of the Luftwaffe's inability to adequately protect oil
facilities.
Between the end of 1944 and March 1945, the Allies made 555 attacks
on 135 Reich targets, which included every known synthetic-fuel plant and
major refinery. The effect on German oil production can be seen from this chart:

PERIOD AVERAGE OUTPUT IN TONS PER MONTH
May, 1944

662,000

June

422,000

December

260,000

March 1945

80,000

The production of aviation gasoline went down from 170,000 tons per
month in mid-1944 to 52,000 in the following March. The Luftwaffe's ability to
51

The Hofherr-Schrantz factory in Vienna-Floridsdorf manufactured parts for the A-4 rocket.
Ruestung in Oesterreich, p 150.
" A Short History, p 264.

19
fight attacking Allied planes in the air was therefore very limited, both in
Germany proper and in Austria. At various times, Goebbels, in his diary, reports
"a total of 7 aircraft" shot down

out of 600 American bombers by German

fighters, then "4 out of 350, " 4 out of 600," and "8 out of 500.After the August
1943 attack on Wiener Neustadt, on the way back to their bases (--then still in
Tunis-) the Allied planes were attacked by 50-60 German Jaegers, but only 3
bombers were hit;

on November 2nd, 1943, during another attack on Wiener

Neustadt, 17 bombers were shot down, by Jaegers and the FLAK."
FLAK
The FLAK
defense in Austria,

turned out to be the only available means of

military air

it operated under the Luftgaukommando XVII as the 24th

FLAK division with 32 batteries in and around Vienna, and with a manpower of
4000 Luftwaffe "helpers." The latter were comprised of specially
civilians and

trained

16- to 18-year-old Hitler Youth boys.55

The American side viewed the FLAK as follows:

Radar was one of the outstanding technical developments of WWII.
Problems though lay in the fact that not only Allied powers made use of
Radar but that the Luftwaffe used it as well, as a means for their own
protection, thus making the bombing operations for the Americans
sometimes hazardous. . . Allied bombers considered flying through flak
the most dangerous part of a mission: they dreaded traveling through the
exploding shells sent up by guns.56

" Final Entries, pp 182,193, 248, 351.
" Per Luftkrieq. p 10. FLAK = Fliegerabwehrkanone (anti-aircraft artillery).
53
Ralf Roland Ringler, Illusion einer Juaend. fVienna-St. Roe It en: Niederoesterreichisches
Pressehaus, 1977) , pp 117-119. In January of 1944, boys with the birth year of 1928 were called
up. Also: Per Luftkneg. p 34.
"Col. Gene Gurney, USAF (Ret.), The War in the Air. WWII (New York: Bonanza Books, 1962)
pp 106,156.
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The 15th AAF, which was the target of the Austrian FLAK, report in their
"Lone Wolf-military pamphlet:

Some battle damage due to flak has been experienced ever
heavily defended targets by Lone Wolf aircraft. It is probable that
some of our losses have been caused either directly, or at least
contributed to, by enemy ground fire. . . Single-aircraft operations
allow for an increase in bombing altitude not possible on normal
operations when formations must be flown. This allows Lone
Wolves to bomb from a height where enemy flak is less effective . .
. In view of the ineffectiveness of the fighter opposition put forth by
the enemy, it is believed that this practice has been proved
sound.57

Despite great efforts and extensive organization, aside from occasional
hits, the FLAK was not very effective, even by the Austrians' own accounts.50 But
although its operations didn't live up to its promise, —"FLAK . . . by itself . . .
downed few planes"-- it did have a function which could not be
dismissed, a fact acknowledged by American pilots:

easily

. . [it ]was annoying and

caused varying damage to aircraft."®
An entrance in Joseph Goebbels' diary,83 on March 16, 1945, noting that
of "some 600 American four-engined bombers ... a total of 7 aircraft were shot
down by our fighters and anti-aircraft,"61 only confirms the ineffectiveness of the
FLAK as well as the Luftwaffe. Disillusioned and dissatisfied, he says:

" 15th AAF. Monograph # 95824: Operational emphasis of Lone Wolfe Tactics (Office of
ACofS, A-3, Oct-Dec 1944) p. 36.
5e
Per Luffkriea. p 35. In addifion, Ulrich says:" The number of the airplanes shot down by
Austrian FLAK fire cannot be determined with the available documentation."
"The United States & World War II. p 200.
e0
Reich Minister for Propaganda
"Fnal Entries, p 182.
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The air war has now turned into a crazy orgy. We are totally defenceless
against it. The Reich will gradually be turned into a complete desert.
Responsibility for this lies at the door of Goering and his Luftwaffe. It is
absolutely not in any position to put up any form of defence.®

Although the military leadership on both sides found the Austrian FLAK
ineffective, one particular participant in the air war got to experience its effect in
a way that enabled him to perceive the air war over Vienna from a special
perspective: the 15th AAF

bomber pilot, Lieutenant

Parker, describes his

predicament at being shot out of the sky on a bomber mission

rather

laconically: "... B-17 was hit by flak and immediately burst into flames . . .
bailed out."63 FLAK crews took their assignment very seriously. If a FLAK gunner
managed to shoot down

a plane, it became

a major boost to his and his

collegues' morale.
Despite the overall ineffectiveness of the FLAK operations, the towers
were

manned at all times. FLAK operators

used their time effectively;

education was brought right to the crews of the batteries, with teachers
conducting classes on the premises. Education even included

readings by

poets and authors, as well as musical performances by the Vienna Choir Boys.
Citizens' air raid protection
The Reich had prepared itself as early as 1939 for air defense,51

fully

realizing that the cooperation of the citizens was going to be important for
meeting the onslaught of aerial bombing physically as well as psychologically.

62

Goebbels in his Final Entries, on March 1, 1945, p. 21. Note: because Goebbels did not
like Goering, accusations of the latter's ineptitude are often found in Final Entries.
" Cuckoo, p. 94. ( Parker then stayed until the end of the war in a Viennese hospital.)
" See Air Defense Law, Reichsgesetzblatt - RGBI. I s.1631, from September 1, 1939, Box
1942/1, Police Archives.
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The psychological part was

put into practice later, when the bombings

actualily started, through extensive propaganda, with the goal of counteracting
the enemy's stated purpose of lowering

civilian morale through bombing.

Preparations for helping the citizen survive the bombing raids physically, began
already in 1939 and consisted of:
bomb shelters,
orders and regulations, and
relief programs.

Bomb shelters
Bomb shelters were operated according to the "Order for air shelters"
("Schutzraumordnung").65

The

shelters

had

to

be

utilized

according

to

prescribed rules of behavior, some of which were practiced in special drills.® At
the sound of an alarm, all persons in buildings, apartments, offices, shoos,
theaters, inns, streets, e.t.c., were required to proceed to an air shelter room.
The following rules had to be observed:
They had to be in posession of a "Lufischutzkoffer'-air shelter suit casewhich was to contain family documents and a gas mask. They had to observe
certain prohibitions:
No smoking!
No animals, except seeing-eye dogs or other service dogsi57
<s Al! regulations, contained in the Air Protection Law, September 1, 1 939, in folder 6-8, box
82, City Archives.
46
6-hour-air defense training courses with information about its organization as well as proper
behavior were conducted as early as 1939. Ibid.
eT
This was one rule that was not always enforced. No proper little old lady was expected to
even conceive of leaving her iap dog behindl
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The bomb shelters had to be organized in a prescribed way; some of the
requirements were as follows:
Air shelters were supposed to be in basements, tunnels, or caves.
Each shelter was supposed to house not more than 50 persons.
At least three cubic meters of space was required for each person.
An emergency exit was obligatory.
All openings were supposed to be made "gas-safe," with a covering of
cloth, felt, rubber, glue or even paper.
Before the war, most basements of buildings served as storage facilities
for heating materials (wood or coal) or bulk groceries (potatoes, onions, etc) It
took some adapting to turn them into makeshift shelters, in order to give every
citizen maximum protection, adherance to the rules and regulations was not
only expected but was also enforced by the authority of an air shelter warden.
Each apartment house had a designated "Luftschutzwart," --air shelter
warden-- whose orders were to be strictly followed.
chosen from

male residents too old for military service,

These wardens were
disabled veterans, or

men designated as indispensable."®
The duties of the warden were, like everything else, heavily regulated.®
One of his responsibilities was to make certain, that all tenants of the apartment
house were present in the basement and that each family or single person had
brought their air shelter suitcase. He also had to admit, aside from tenants, other
people

who happened to be on the streets when the sirens sounded, but this

particular regulation was rather ambiguous. According to paragraph 2 of the air
68

The German word "unabkoemmlich" (indispensable [from their job]) was shortened to

"UK."
88

"Duties of warden": folder 6-8, box 82, City Archives.
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shelter lav;, "pedestrians are to be admitted to shelters -- if there is sufficient
room. If the air shelter rooms are not sufficient, the pedestrians are to be given
protection in covered spaces against shrapnel.The phrase, "if there is
sufficient room," was of course much too vague. It was easy enough for a willful
warden to declare a basement filled to capacity and off-limits to strangers. In
turning citizens away, a warden was in a position to flaunt his power arbitrarily,
or behave in a bureaucratic manner, sticking to the letter of the regulation.
One particular incident involving a telephone meter reader, Karoline
Ledinegg, illustrates the ambiguity of the particular phrasing "sufficient room.71
Following a
street

schedule of planned routes,

Ledinegg often found herself on the

when the sirens sounded and had to seek whatever shelter

was

available for her protection.
"That day,"

Karoline Ledinegg recounts, "after finishing with the last

customer, I began to run down the street, trying to make it home to the second
district where I lived (-and still live.) I was relatively close, but when I saw the
streets getting empty and heard the noise of approaching planes getting louder,
I decided to seek shelter. I turned to the Philippi Hof apartment complex which
was known for its basement's connection with an extensive underground tunnel
system, and knocked on the house door, but a pompous warden sent me rudely
away because, according to him, the basement's capacity was filled. I finally
took shelter a few houses further down."72 Whether this warden was justified in
turning her away or not is hard to say, but he very probably saved

70

Karoline

Ibid.
Telephone- and telegraph services in Austria were (--and still are-) part of the postal
services. Meter reading has since become automated.
72
Personal interview with Karoline Ledinegg.
71
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Ledinegg's life. In one of the major tragedies of the Vienna air war, the Philippi
Hof was badly hit only minutes later, and several hundred

people in the

basement and the connecting tunnels were killed or reported missing. The
bombs penetrated

so deeply and the damage was so extensive, that many

bodies were never dug out in the clearance process. Today, a modern sculpture
on the location of

the former Philippi Hof commemrnorates

the terrible

disaster.''"3
The average

warden, no doubt, was cordial and cooperative, took his

duties seriously and watched out for his fellow neighbors. Of course, he also
had to follow bureaucratic procedures by keeping records on the fulfillment of
his duties in the "Air Shelter Folder" which was stamped: "Property of the Reich
Air Shelter Association."74
Bomb shelters were the most important
because of the
brainwashing

protection offered to

life-saving facilities in air raids,

virtually every citizen and the

by the government on using them. Most houses, especially

apartment houses and apartment house complexes had

built-in basements,

and additional protection was provided by the government which constructed
extra bunkers and tunnels. Among the latter,

notable examples were the

personal bunker of the Reichsstatthalter of Vienna,

Baldur von Schirach,73 and

the tunnel system underneath the "Philippi Hof" apartment compiex.
But the shelters were only one facet of

the system; in addition, rules,

regulations and directives on air raids covered required equipment, various

" Oesterreich II. p 45. The exact number of victims could never be determined.
"Folder 6-8, box 82, City Hall Archives.
75
It was virtually bomb-proof, and its entrance was camouflaged by the forest surroundings of
its location, the Vienna Woods, which lay within city limits.
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situations and even specific behavior of people.76 Instructions were issued
concerning.
extinguishing white phosphorus bombs,
gas attacks,
disposal of duds,
availability of shelters to pedestrians
use of first aid kit,
air shelter luggage,
black-out times.
The regulation on first aid kits, for example, specified its contents. Besides the
usual items the kit was to also include:
rubber gloves,
soap,
green "smear soap" (for yellow gas accidents)
sodium bicarbonate,
calcium chloride.77
The regulations on the availability of sand and water pails noted:

Sand and water pails are supposed to be not only on stairwells
but in each apartment as well. A pail with water and tne sand
have to be placed next to the entrance. Sand can be picked up at the
"sand locations" and has to be put into strong paper bags
(sacks) capable of containing 5 kilos. The bags can only be
half-filled, have to be tied and pressed flat to be put on top of
each other.

70

All in:10th Additional Order to the Air Defense Law, 9/1/1939. Also:" Kleine Volkszeituna
November 20,1939.
77
for decontamination.
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The regulations on air shelter luggage stated that it had to be positioned next to
the exit door and was to contain:
important personal documents,
coats,
blankets and pillows,
thermos bottle,
toys for children,
groceries.
The regulation on the required black-out times read:

The air command has ordered, until October 31, 1943, that the time of
black-outs be as follows: from 2200 or 2300 to 0400 or 0500 (variation
because of summer months).^

A special regulation on messengers said:

When the house community cannot help itself anymore, (after bombing) it
has to send a messenger who has to have the following: good clothes,
good shoes, head protection, ropes, first aid kit, battery flash light, a
messenger bag in a strong color, (because it can be found easy) with
street and house number written on it, paper and pencil, and a bicycle.
The messenger must be able to transmit the message in writing or orally
(learn by heart.) The message has to be short, containing: "what," "when,"
"where."

The regulation on "Feuerpatsche" (asbestos glove) gave tips on how the
citizens could produce it

"Amtsblatt S Lu/b I-5533, Septembers, 1943, Police Archives.
' Kleine Wiener Volkszeituna. August 30,1939, reprinted from the Voelkischer Beobachter.
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The asbestos glove is a most necessary item for fighting fire. With it the
base of the fire can be beaten out. Each household should have one.
Because the need is so great, each citizen has to be instructed to
produce such an item. The needed material can surely be found in each
household. They are: a broom stick, cloth rags, wire or string . . .

The population's proper behavior was not only

expected inside the

shelters, but also outside of buildings. Here are some of the rules:80
In open places, lie on the ground.
In markets, protect groceries by covering them against "liquid weapons"
("fluessige Kampfstoffe.")81
Stop driving vehicles and park them so that an open lane exists.
Some regulations addressed particular groups of citizens, such as "wardisabled" relatives of police officials, directing
installation set up only for them,82 or

them to seek help at an

"cable-walkers," who had to

report

damage to cables after air raids.® The "cable-walkers" had to walk the length of
the underground cables and inspect them tor damage after air raids so that
immediate repair could be initiated. They carried an

identification and wore a

white arm band, imprinted with swastika and the words "Deutsche Reichspost "Soforthilfe" -"First aid;" and they were to be assisted and supported by the
police, if necessary.
There were

also directives concerning trivial

subjects, such as fishing,

elimination of rats, and the opening-times of shops. For example,whoever had
the desire to do some fishing had to consult the "Fischerei Ordnung," which

90

According to 10th Procedure Order of the Air Defense Law, September 1,1939.
" For example: jellied gasoline, gases.
82
Regulation P 11.05, March 14,1944, Police Archives.
83
RegulationSn. I/Fe - 2331, December 1,1944, Police Archives.
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directed him to authorized locations such as the Donaukanai at specific times.^
These

announcements not only served to inform the population of the

restoration of

services that were formerly interrupted through bomb damages,

but also tried to convey to the population the notion that life was proceeding
normally. The latter was regarded important

in keeping up the spirit and the

morale of the people.
And then, there were "orders" or mere official suggestions, the intentions
of which were so specific that they bordered on the ridiculous. One household
item that warranted a regulation of its own was the Conformity Reich Soap
("Reicheinheitsseife")85 which described in detail

the "specifications" of this

cheaply made tallow soap. Anything better was considered a luxury and
therefore banned. This regulation was not in too much danger of being violated,
simply because of the lack of better items.
Published advice on underwear and stockings could be read in the
Voelkischer Beobachter which said, "Each person should have underwear and
stockings to change, so that after 48 hours he won't look like a hobo."® Citizens
(who for the most part didn't own vehicles) were assured that "No parking"
regulations did not apply during attacks. Regarding the "people's gas mask,"
one

particular

specification stated: "The gas mask is to be put on calmly.

Breathe as little as possible!"87
But trivial or not, adherence to these regulations often provided
difference between survival and non-survival.

"'Regulation 111/87.00, May 5, 1944, PoliceArchives.
Box 82-6, folder 10, City Archives.
" from April 8,1941.
67
A.BI. SLu/b 1-5510, Police Archives.
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the

While extra care might have
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seemed exaggerated to the non-bureaucratic mind, the two following
demonstrate

its

importance.

Augartenstrasse #70, next to a

In the first case,

a

incidents

bomb hit the

house

nursery school in the 2nd district, on

March

12th, 1945 but penetrated only as far as the second floor. Because the people
in the basement had proper equipment, (the legally prescribed tools,) they were
able

to

break

through

the joint

wall

to

the

nursery

school

building

(Augartenstrasse # 68) with the help of a sledgehammer, escape the still falling
debris, and join the terrified but unhurt children there.®
Regulations were violated In the second case and people paid with their
iives. The regulation on "emergency wails" stated that each person was
supposed to know which wall had been designated as the break-through wall.
The top of the wall was to be marked with the words: "Connecting opening to
the neighboring house" (street name, # ...) as well as with the appropriate
arrows. The part to be broken was to be marked with paint; and its approach
was to be kept free at all times.®
Ali

the

inhabitants of an

apartment

house

in

the 2nd

district's

Karmelitergasse 2, drowned, when water pipes were hit and water flooded the
basement. The previous actions of the owner of a Gasthaus, located in the next
house,

prevented the victims' escape; he had improperly stacked the escape

wall with hoarded barrels of wine. "I can still see --so many

years later- the

sidewalk and adjacent street flooded with water that had come out of the
basement,"

86

recalled Karoline Ledinegg, "and the front of the shoe store, also

One of the few memories I myself have from the bombing period. Also: Christine Klusacek
& Kurt S'immer. Leopoldstarii. Eine Insel mitten in der Stadt. (Vienna: Kurt Moh!, 1978) , p 188.
88
Reprintings of paragraphs of Air Defense Order, August 20,1943, Police Archives.
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located in this building, where the helpers had laid out, in several rows,

the

drowned, wet bodies.90
The impact of

strict adherence to rules by the citizens cannot be

overstressed. Compliance with regulations contributed to the survival of many
citizens who might have perished under less organized conditions.
There was still another form of survival enhancement the citizen could
turn to, in times of need: the Reich services in the form of various
Relief programs
People survived air attacks

also because of the government

organizations.9,1 For the citizens who had
but the clothes on their back, shock was

relief

lost their home and had nothing left
minimized by the immediacy and

efficiency of the government relief institutions which sprang into action as soon
as the planes had left. These institutions were:
the Department E of Health Matters and National Customs,
the NSV,
the NSDAP itself.
People were never left homeless or without food if they followed
prescribed procedures. To remind victims of bombing of the existing policy

of

governmental assistance, the Chief of Police issued an executive order, the
"Order concerning war damages and procedures for answering claims." In it he
pointed out that it was the special wish of the Fuehrer that the population hit by
enemy air attacks "will be at least free from material worries."92

80 Interview, Ledinegg.
S
'AII in RGBI. I. S. 1547, Police Archives.
"A 2 - 2896/1942, July 1942, Police Archives.
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While the latter words would be considered an understatement

by the

most ardent believer in the Reich, it was at least true that the bombing victims
were indeed provided with a great number of services :
new living quarters for the "bombed-out,"
recovery of salvageable household goods from the ruins,
clean-up of the site, so traffic would not be hindered,
removal and depositing of tons of debris and the destruction of
dangerous ruins.
Rehousing of bombing victims93
One priority after air attacks was

immediate attention to the

Casualties had to be accounted for in a report, called "Enumeration
wounded, taken ill [sic] or killed
marked

victims.
of the

The report had to be forwarded immediately,

"fiiegerbeschaedigt" --"air raid-damages" to

the Central Registration

Office, the District Registration Office or to the Office for Obituaries in the case of
death, after which, other Reich institutions took over.
Obtaining interim living quarters for "bombed-out" persons was relegated
to the Homeless Registration Office (Obdachlosenanmeldestelle

or "OS," to

which victims were referred, according to a special directive.91 The NSDAP itself
directed and applied this help to the citizens and appropriated and adapted for
these purposes restaurants, coffeehouses,

movie theaters, schools and other

larger buildings to serve as interim living quarters. A school, for example, was
large enough to house about 500, a restaurant about 150 and a movie theater
about 1,200 people.96

" Reichsleistungsgesetz, published in RGBI. I, 1939, S. 1645, Police Archives.
84
#3311, based on #5, Reichsleistungsgesetz, RGBI. I, 1939, S. 1645, Police Archives.
" Collection "Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/82-1 ('Statistics"), City Archives.
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Officials followed a specified procedure to aid victims of damaged or
destroyed apartment houses.® Police brought citizens to an OS office where, if
necessary, physicians were ready to tend to the wounded. Data was taken and
the victims

were counseled and immediately assigned and registered to their

new living quarters, if they filled out a particular form, an official even went back
to the damaged house for the purpose of retrieving household goods or
vehicles. The owner could either accompany him, or the official would catalog
items for later identification and put them in storage after entering everything on
the appropriate list, complete with three copies.
Victims could receive clothes and other necessities; payments of rent and
even of their salaries would be made for them, if their working place had been
shut down as a result of bomb damage. This office also issued a very important
paper, the "proof of need" document,97 which enabled

the victim to replace all

rationing cards. These procedures in turn prompted another avalanche of forms
to be filled out by shop owners who had to enter their new customers on the
appropriate lists for Reich egg tickets, Reich milk tickets and Reich marmelade
tickets and send a report for further registration to the State Nutrition Office.
Sometimes, particularly high numbers of "bombed-out" homeless people
confronted the officials. On Oct 17, 1944, for example, 6,192 people became
homeless and on Nov 15, 1944, 13,402 people were rendered without a home.
For the year 1944 altogether, which still saw less bombing than the beginning
months

of 1945, almost 64,000 people

were rendered homeless. The total

number of apartments lost through the air war, was 86,875.®
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Ibid.
"Bedarfsnachweis."
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Ibid.
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Another source
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cites 76,000 apartments destroyed and 101,000 damaged, and estimates the
total Austrian war damages from the bombing (--transposed to the price level of
1991/92) to be approximately $270 billion.®
The Department E of Health Matters and National Customs was willing to
provide services for the citizens in need, if the latter followed directions:100
(1) The homeless were to go to collection points where they were to be
fed and taken care of. They were to be given a shelter (in adapted movie
theaters, schools, restaurants.)
(2) They were not to depart without informing officials.
(3) They were to always register with the police.
(4) "Certificates of departure" were necessary when moving elswhere. It
was important also for getting new ration cards and clothes-issue cards.
Other functions of the Department E were:101
(1) feeding and housing the bomb victims after air attacks,
(2) rerouting of bomb victims to other cities,
(3) sending children to the countryside,102
(4) the building of birth clinics and homes for mothers with infants,
(5) providing young mothers with additional help in immediate placement
of their babies in nursery schools,
(6) tending to wounded soldiers who had been sent to a Vienna
hospital. This service was so extensive and so prescribed that it even
had a regulation about the kind of presents to be supplied to the soldiers.
68

Austrian Societal and Economic Museum, documentation series/'Das Museum kommt zu
den Besuchern," board: "75 Jahre Republik Oesterreich," # 8 & 9
100
November 26,1943/ RD-31/43, group VI, Box 82-5, City Archives.
0
' ' Reichsverfuegungsblati # 11/44, NSDAP Party Office, September 29,1944.
10?
This operation, the "Kinderiandverschickung," was controversial and wil! be explored
further in chapter 6

Debris disposal103
The destruction by the bombing created also a number of other
problems, such as traffic hmderances and endangering of public health. By the
end of the war, the bombing had created 800,000 cubic meters of debris (about
a million tons), the disposal of which required

vehicles, gasoline, and an

especially large work force.
A separate problem was the re-use of the debris. The bombing victims
tried to retrieve as much as they could and put it to new use. There was even a
kind of systematic recycling, organized by a private company with the help of
the city government. Metai was shredded, glass melted, bricks cleaned and
reused. Aii these activities continued for some time, even after

the war was

over.
A shortage of vehicles mads debris

disposal difficult. Most vehicles of

the city garbage disposal department were damaged and destroyed, in ali, 121
trucks, 85 trailers, 232 specialty vehicles and 800 hand-buggies were lost.
There was a lack of an adequate work force to repair the vehicles; and on top of
it, the main city repair shop in the 20th district was hit in a bombing attack and
rendered unusable.
Clearing of the streets was a priority of the city government in order that
traffic and daily activities could resume as soon as possible. At the end of the
"all-clear" alarm, the population left their basements to survey the damage, if
buildings in their neighborhood had been hit, they were confronted with piles of
bricks, roof tiles, roof troughs, torn electrical wires, broken street car high wires,
broken light poles and shattered glass. The view was traumatic, but besides a
vision of destruction there could also be hidden time bombs or unexploded
'""Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/82-1 ('Statistics"), p 22, City Archives.

bombs lying several

meters under the ground, wailing to be dug up and

disposed. Sometimes the street had been transformed into a "carpet" of bomb
craters which needed to be filled in and evened with the street surface. During
the bombing period, 4620 craters were counted and repaired, quite often by the
neighborhood people themselves who formed brigades and assisted each
other in order to create "normal" conditions again as quickly as possible. Noninvolved spectators were warned not to linger in the streets so as not to hinder
ciean-up efforts;

if the police found curiosity-seekers watching, the latter were

quickly commandeered to join in on the clean-up operation.
The significance of the air defense system lay not only in its design, its
attention to detail, and its nationwide application, but in its enforcement
provisions which were the responsibility of each local government. The Air
Defense Law which regulated behavior under bombardment was a significant
factor in

saving

lives and providing

for those who needed help. The

population's willingness to adherence to rules and regulations was in the end of
great benefit.

CHAPTER 3:

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF VIENNA

. . . those, my Fuehrer, are the people . . . Their yearning is Germany!
their faith is Germany! Their loyalty is Germany! Adolf Hitler, be their
protector! For you are Germany! Our Germany! . . . 1CS

Regardless of the seemingly overwhelming welcome Hitier had received
from the population at his entrance into Vienna, on March 12, 1933,106 he was
well aware that her integration into the Reich was not going to be easy. Hitler
had a love-hate relationship with Vienna, a city that had treated him unkindly in
the years from 1907 to 1914 when, at one time, he had to live in a shelter for
homeless.1o7This city was different from its German counterparts. In April 1943,
he voiced his disapproval of Vienna's population: "It was a mistake that I even
received these

Viennese

into the Reich. I know these people. I have lived

among them in my youth, they are enemies of Germany."105
"The

Austrian problem"l°9

was created by the disintegration of the

Habsburg Empire by the end of World War I. Previously the prominent and
dominating force in a large multinational empire, Austria was

reduced to a

small, insignificant country whose citizens now experienced a feeling of
impotence. While the population had not yet fully come to accept the situation of
the country, her status was altered, once again, by the Anschluss. Despite the
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Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, predecessor of Baldurvon Schirach, Joachim Remak, ed., The
Nazi Years (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p 69.
ice Officially legalized: March 13,1938.
107
Peter Young, A Short History of World War II 1939-1945. (New York: Crowell Co.,1966), p
8.
108 Baldur von Schirach, Ich alaubte an Hitler. (Hamburg: Mosaik Verlag, 1967) , p 293.
109 Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda. ( London: Oxford University, 1964) , p 118-20.
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jubilant welcome Hitler had received at his entrance into the city, the beginning
of the war had dampened considerably the enthusiasm of the population for its
new regime.110 Vienna was certainly officially but not mentally integrated into the
German Reich, as its citizens began to look upon the Germans as intruders. As
the tides of war turned, greater disillusionment set in; and the beginning of the
American bombing campaign further aggravated the ambivalent feelings of the
population.
While the Anschluss did not change the scope of city government nor its
organizational structure, city administration now came to be controlled by the
Nazi party system in a vertical as well as horizontal sense. It was difficult for the
citizens to deal with the symbiotic relationship between the Nazi Party and the
city government, since many party leaders were at the same time high state
officials.111 Those higher Nazi officials who were transferred from Germany to the
new Gau had to learn that they simply could not regard Vienna as a mere
extension of Germany and the party, and that in order to achieve their aims in
the city, it was best

to make some allowances for the quirks of the Viennese

mentality.112
On August 2, 1940, still hoping to make real Germans out of the
Viennese, he appointed Baldur von Schirach as the new Reichstatthalter and
Gauleiter of Vienna,113 justifying his move by citing the mistakes of Schirach's

1,0

Ibid.
Franz Neumann, Behemoth The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. CLondon:
Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1942) , p65.
1,2
Ibid.
3
" Nazi- administered regions were divided into Gaue, headed by a Gauleiter, who was at the
same time Reichsstatthalter (governor) and the head of the Party, Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) , p 9.
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predecessor. Buercke!.114 "The situation in Vienna is dismal," he said in a
conversation with Schirach, "Gauleiter Buercke! has not understood how to win
over the Viennese to the Reich. I cannot afford in these times, to have a
rebellious city in the South Eastern corner of the Reich. Somebody has to go to
Vienna who possesses psychological tact."
Hitler's worries about this southeastern outpost of the Reich seemed to
confirm the general belief that Vienna was "different," that the priorities of the
Viennese did not necessarily match those of the Germans, and that in Vienna
cultural matters overrode other considerations. In his conversation with
Schirach, Hitler blamed
atmosphere

former Gauleiter Buerckel for having created an

"hostile to the Reich." If Buerckel's mistakes in carrying out the

Aryanization project were not bad enough, Hitler said, the social faux pas

he

committed, were of even greater gravity: "He took off his jacket in the dining
room of the Imperial Hotel and dined in suspenders. And in the Opera House,
he occupied the VIP box in a business suit.""1'
Hitler considered Schirach not only perfect for the position in Vienna
because of Schirach's devotion to him, but
background. (He was
American-born

also because of his cosmopolitan

born in Berlin to a theater director father and a wealthy

mother) Schirach came to understand that by considering the

cultural wishes of the Viennese population and by appreciating their mentality
he could

gain their cooperation more easily in political matters. But even

though the population obeyed imposed rules and regulations, Schirach was not
able to

prevent

general

"4 Ich alaubte. p 264-7.
"5 Ich aiaubte. p 268.

disillusionment,

particularly

during

the bombing
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campaigns. As the bombing proceeded, Schirach increasingly was forced
walk

a

tightrope

between

humoring

the

Viennese

population

to

whose

cooperation was of utmost importance, and pleasing Hitler whose goals and
philosophy he was supposed to promote. It
were aspects of life in Vienna

also became obvious that there

that the Nazi party couid not easily control. To

Schirach's chagrin, he was blamed for the lack of enthusiasm for the war effort
among the Viennese by other high Nazi officials and ultimately also

by the

Fuehrer himself. One of the leaders who disliked Schirach was the Minister for
Culture and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, who in April 1943 had complained
several times to Hitler about the Gauleiter's "Kulturpolitik;" it did not coincide at
al! with Goebbels' tastes.
On April 22, 1943, in a conversation with war Minister Albert Speer, Hitler,
then prone

to blaming

his lieutenants for disastrous events, expressed

fears that Schirach "had lost his clear view of the interest of the Reich."

his

1,6

Because of its background and tradition as the capita! city of a former
major multinational empire, the Viennese not only took great pride in their
cultural life, especially in their music and theater which matched world
standards, but also in the excellent infrastructure and public services of the city.
Because ambitious people from the different nations of the former empire had
gravitated to the capital city in a quest for better opportunities, their diversified
skills ana experiences had enhanced Vienna's professional world. The greater
competition for jobs resulted in an excellent, multilingual administration and
well- organized city services, such as the police-, fire- and public transportation
departments.

Ich glaubte. p 295.
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The general war situation presented more than enough problems for the
city government to maintain essential day-to-day services, preserve the cultural
life of the city and guarantee the smooth operation of a functioning bureaucracy.
But the persistent

bombing that began in 1944 confronted the city government

with an added, new, and complex challenge:
Prompted by the deteriorating situation at the front and the decision of
the Allies to carry out renewed bombing of German cities, this time also
including Vienna, Hitler proclaimed a new phase of the war, that of a "total war
effort:""7

The war situation forces us to implement the full utilization of all
forces of the Wehrmacht and armament; therefore I order
the
chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Reich defense, Reich
Marshal Hermann Goering, to adjust the whole public life to the
necessities of total war effort, in every regard.
All public events
have to view as a goal the total war effort . . . The whole state
apparatus, including Reich railroads, post and all public
institutions and organizations have to be adjusted to meet the
goal of a total rational effort ["Einsatz"] of people and means . . .
so that the highest potential of forces for the Wehrmacht and
armament is available.

As a result, Viennese citizens had to confront not only
conditions of hazardous

bombing

but also

the strained

the harrassment of "total war"

sanctions. The total war effort campaign became the Nazi government's most
intense focus. Its swift, sweeping and severe implementation engulfed all facets
of daily life; its implication for

the citizens involved a number of

added

discomforts and sacrifices as their cooperation was requested regarding:
Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBI.) # 34/1944, Berlin, July 27,1944, Folder 1-123. acc. nr. 3387,
Haus- Hof- urxd Staatsarchrv (City Archives).
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(1) the continuation and enforcement of war production
(2) the Volkssturm (Home Guard) and Labor Services
(3) public services and aid programs
(4) the general work force
(5) the curtailing of cultural life
(6) nutrition and health matters.118

Continuation of war production
As Adolf Hitler insisted in his proclamation of total war, the production of
weapons was to be continued at all costs. To ammunition factory workers, this
was nothing new as they were constantly urged on by circulated letters of the
NSDAP -- Gauleitung Vienna , such as the following:

Our enemies who cannot conquer us in an open fight and in the
battles on the front, are now trying to break the morale
of our
population and to interrupt the production of goods, important for
the war, by brutal terror-attacks on the cities of our homeland. It is
therefore imperative for every factory to see to it that the greatest
obstacles are overcome and that armament potential is not only
maintained but production is increased . . . Preparedness is
everthing. Reichsleiter and Reichsstatthalter Baldur v. Schirach
has created extensive measures for protection. In maintaining
production, we want to stand fully and totally on his side. However
hard fate may touch us, we will be harder and will suffer through.
We are protecting our city, which we love with all our heart, and we
are maintaining unconditionally the production capacity of our
factories in order to deliver weapons to the front and to continue
production of the products important for the achievement of victory.
. . The Fuehrer expects from us the highest degree of readiness
and we give it willingly, because the final goal of this world war is a
free Germany."9
"6The latter three will be explored in chapters 4 (Population) and 5 (Health).
1,8
Special Letter #1. Die deutsche Arbeitsfront. March 1944.
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And indeed, armament production

continued in the whole Reich, and

despite heavy bombing reached its maximum in the fall of 1944.120 In Vienna,
damaged factory buildings were repaired as rapidly as possible in order to
maintain

the volume of war materials produced;

somewhere else, to tunnels, into forests and
transponation were

production also was moved

to the countryside. All means of

kept running as long as possible. Consequently, in 1944,

450,000 people were employed as members of the German Labor Front in war
production in Vienna.121 Conscripted reluctantly like the
front,

they contributed

to the war effort. Armament production

reached its zenith in the Fall of 1944,122
resources

soldiers on the war

despite the fact that

in Austria
transport of

and manpower became more and more difficult.

Already in 1938, a plan was created to integrate Austria into German
armament production. On March 26, 1938, Hermann Goering announced from
the lobby of the Vienna North West Railway Station his "Build-up Program for
Austria," which

emphasized

the build-up of an armament industry and the

utilization of Austrian raw materials. And Goering was not shy in reminding the
Austrians that they were the ones who were supposed to do the work. "One
should not think in Austria," he said in the railway station, "that

men would

come from the Reich to take up the work and set the table for the Austrians.'-123
On

the contrary, he would

see to it that the Austrians utilized their own

workforce to capacity.
120 Mfiissnsr Magda Goebbels. The First Ladv of the Third Reich (New York Dial
Press,1980) , p 229. Also : Radomir Luza, Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) , pp 208-9.
Ibid.
Ruestuna in Oesterreich. p 144.
Ruestun? in Oesterreich. p 29.
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Austria's industry before the war consisted of "peace-time" factories,
producing consumer goods; there was littie

heavy industry until the Reich, at

the beginning of 1942, transferred some of its armament factories and outlets to
Austria

and

intensified this move in 1943 and 1944; but even then factories

were rather sparse.ist These transfers had the effect of making Austria a more
important target for bombing.
The Austrian economist

Ferdinand Tremel acknowledges125

that in

addition to the few armament plants in the country, there existed small firms that
were moved into apartment houses
production.

as a way of secretly continuing war

Information about these small armament production plants in

apartment houses supposedly had been transmitted to the Allies and the
planning staff of the bomber raids. Camouflaged as children day care centers,
scientific and social institutions, these small factories were engaged in
production

in the middle of housing areas. Because of the Allied intelligence's

information however,

the civilians became

more vulnerable as their houses

were bombarded. But, Tremel maintains, the small factory outlets did not have a
great impact on the overall Reich war production; instead, railroads and

oil

facilities presented more valuable targets.
In 1943, sixty percent of the Reich oil production

came already from

Austrian oil fields,12 and the 15th AAF was able to neutralize these sources as
well as oil depots early in the air war.127 The two first major attacks occurred on

Ferdinand TrRmfil WirtRchafts- and Sozialaeschichte Oasterreich? (Vienna: Franz
Deuticke, 1969), pp 391-2.
,2<,
Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria. Empire and Republic. 1815-1986 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,1987), p 194.
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June

16 and June 26,

1944, with a concentration on the refineries of

Moosbierbaum, but also of Korneuburg, Schwechat and, located within the city,
Vienna-Kagran and Vienna-Floridsdorf. After further attacks on July 8, July 25,
and August 28, 1944, the damage was severe enough to seriously hamper the
Nazi war effort.
Volkssturm (Home Guard)
The mobilization of the Volkssturm was another means for

the city

government to increase the contributions of Vienna to the war effort. On August
16,

1944, the following

document, stamped "classified," and "not to be

published," was sent to party officials:"123

I order the leaders of the party-offices to prepare the necessary
arrangements for the total war effort. They are authorized to close
offices, partially or totally, and to use those freed (human) sources
for war-essential activities or offer thern to the Wehrmacht and
armament.
Fuehrerhauptquartier Munich, July 20,1944, signed: Adolf Hitler.

"Those freed sources," which Hitler mentioned, were to be used tor "waressential activities" by making them reluctant members of the Volkssturm. Thus,
they joined other men, conscripted from those above and below draft age and
those who because of a "lack of

ability or other war-important employment" did

not belong to a fighting force. As propaganda tried to impress on them,

they

were now, like their brothers at the front, "soldiers of the homeland," defending

126

Reichsverfuegungsblatt 10/44, NSDAP Party Office, Munich. Oesterreichisches
Staatsarchiv (State Archives), Box 383. One cannot help but notice that Hitler gave this order on
the day of the assassination attempt on his Irfe!
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their home city.129 Later, betore and during the siege of Vienna, the Volkssturm
performed necessary preparatory services for

resisting the Soviet invading

forces, such as digging trenches and erecting

barricades, as weil as actual

hand-to-hand fighting in the streets.
Some of the rules

that applied to the status of a Volkssturm

member

were:130
(1) Service in the Volkssturm had priority over service in all other
organizations, although

membership in non-job-related organizations

was not affected.
(2) The Guard's military organization and outfitting was the
responsibility of the Waffen-SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler.131
(3) Every member was required to attend a 5-day course of instruction.132
Many members of the Volkssturm were reluctant draftees from the work
force, since each work place had to make a certain number of people available
to participate in the force. It didn't matter much what type of work the person
previously had performed. For all practical purposes, to be drafted into the
Vokssturm by an employer, equaled a kind of demotion and often fell on citizens
who did not openly glorify the Reich, who were looked upon suspiciously, and
who did not know anybody in the hierarchy who could change their fate. It was
not unusual to draft
Liebscher, until then
129

intellectuals -a case in point being
the director of

Professor Dr.

a scientific research institute, who was

Kleine Wiener Kriegszeitung. October 14, 1944, p 2, cl.
Kleine Wiener Krieoszeitung. October14, 1944, pi, c 2,3.
'3The SS, (Schutz Staffel) a paramilitary organisation, had three sections: the "general" SS,
the Troops on Hand, called the 'Waffen (weapons) SS --they were the elite fighting troops- and
the Totenkopfformationen (Death Head or Skull formations) who ran the concentration camps,
Behemoth, p 63.
'"Order la VB - 107/45. February 5,1945, box 147, State Archives.
130
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recruited to be the ieadei of a Volkssturm battalion, in charge of border
security.133
Propaganda glorified the Volkssturm, as it did all the other measures of
the Reich. Citizens could listen to speeches coming over the radio at home or in
the basement shelters, if there was a lull in the noise of the bombing, as the
Party initiated the Volkssturm's creation with the necessary pomp. In addition,
the press supported and enhanced Hitler's proclamation of the event.

Under

the headline "Call to the German Nation", a Viennese newspaper reported:

In the hour when the force of the enemy sweeps over all the fronts, with
the declared aim of smashing the Reich with its abundant people and
material and destroying the German nation, the Fuehrer raises his voice
and appeals to the whole nation to resist and fight with all possible
means.--The Fuehrer orders the formation of the German Volkssturm! .. .
I order that in the regions of the Great German Reich, the German
Volkssturm, composed of all able-bodied men, aged 16-60 years, is to
be organized, for the purpose of defending the home ground with all
weapons and all means. The structure and the leadership of the German
Volkssturm will be handled by the
regional leaders, utilizing the
institutions of the existing institutions of the party, the SA, the Waffen-SA
and the HJ. The members of the German Volkssturm are during their
deployment soldiers according to the military law.134

Heinrich

Himmler's speech on the following day further described the

Volkssturm agenda:

'"Order lilb Lf- 108/45, February 19,1945, Box 147, State Archives.
Kleine Wiener Kriegszertung. October 14.1944, p 1. c 1-3, and October 19, 1944, p1,c
1-3. Four former Vienna newspapers were merged and officially published as the Kleine Wiener
Krieaszeituna. beginning with September 1, 1944. This paper was the only official and
sanctioned source of news for the Viennese population aside from the NSDAP-published Per
Voelkische Beobachter. The Kleine Wiener Kriegszertuna was discontinued in April 1945 and
the other papers installed again.
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Voikssturmmaenner!
Today, on the . . . 131st anniversary of the "Battle of Nations in Leipzig,"
our Fuehrer and highest "war lord" has called all able-bodied German
men between the ages of 16 and 60, still at home, to be deployed to the
German Volkssturm in order to defend the home ground. . . In soldier-like
calmness, so typical for our faithful and brave German nation, shall we,
men and women, having withstood courageously and unshakably, five
war years on the front and in the homeland, . . .help the Wehrmacht in
endangered regions . . . Outwardly and inwardly we will prepare
ourselves for this duty. We swear that, like our fathers, we will be faithful;
faithful to the Fuehrer, sent to us by Our Lord, faithful to the Reich, which
has united all German tribes after centuries, representing the power of
order of the European continent, now and in the future, faithful to the
nation and therefore to ourselves, and . . . [we will] defend our nation.,a6

Labor

Services'36

Already in 1935, the Compulsory Labor Service Law was enacted, which
obligated each young German citizen to serve, in the public interest, for six
months in one of the Labor Services, which contained further specified
branches, such as:
the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) - Reich employment service,
the Kriegshilfsdienst -- war effort aid service, and
the Erntehilfe --harvest aid.
These particular services had not only an economic impact but

often

served to provide the essentials for survival.
Women piayed a special role in the Reich Labor Services where, in
addition to regular duties, they displayed their resilience, as well as their
physical and emotional strength by performing work that had formerly been
Kleine Wiener Krieaszeitunq. October 19,1944, pi, c 2-3, and p 2-4, c 1-3.
'"Hannah Vogt, "Life in the Third Reich" in Robert G. L. Waite, ed, Hitler and Nazi Germany
(New York: Hott, Rlnehart and Winston, 1965), p 66.
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done by men. Never before had women, though active,

been lhat visible in the

work force, except in traditionally feminine professions, such as nurses,
teachers, seamstresses, maids, etc. Recruited for these services, most often to
their chagrin, they were called "Kriegsdienstmaiden," -"war service maids"137
and worked in the country outside of Vienna as well as in municipal jobs, such
as driving street cars or punching tickets. Many young, unmarried women were
drafted to do housework in farm homes in the country. Adhering to the 60-hour
week prescribed in the Kriegseinsatz order, the hours were as grueiing as the
circumstances were difficult.
Numerous orders and memos to various Reich offices were sent daily by
high officials, both German and Austrian, such as

the Reichsstatthalter of

Vienna himself, to remind bureau heads of utilizing work forces to the fullest, in
both the private economy as well as the public. A typical letter was sent to "the
highest Reich institutions" on August 19, 1944:

The work force is our most precious resource! Its full utilization is
therefore the goal of the total war effort. Our motive has to be based on
the principle that the largest possible effort has to be attempted with the
least possible work forces. Heil Hitler! Signed: Dr. Goebbels."133

Public services and aid programs
To keep the city

functioning properly during the bombardment, great

efforts were required. Adherence to rules and regulations was often only
possible by the utilization of

practical sense, imagination and presence of mind

in carrying them out.
137

Oesterreich 11. p 49.
'"Carton 124 'Totaler Kriegseinsatz", State Archives.
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Public transportation
Vienna's well-organized public transportation system of a wide network
of streetcars, buses and subways, came to a standstill as soon as the cuckoo
call (the warning signal of the air defense system) was heard. Everybody,
including streetcar employees, had to seek shelter, abandoning the streetcars
on the tracks. It took a while before service could be reinstated because tracks
had to be cleared and electrical lines sorted out and repaired.
"If you had to perform work in various parts of the city, as I did," Karoline
Ledinegg recalls,"139 "you relied, like a lot of other citizens, on your own two feet.
Because not many people owned a telephone at that time, my route was spread
over the whole city and I found myself sometimes on its outskirts when the
bombing attack was over. Rather than waiting, I would start walking home."
As gasoline-powered trucks, city and commercial vehicles,

were

gradually put out of action through successful bombing and fuel shortages, the
streetcar system turned out to be the most resilient means of transportation and
came to handle various utilitarian functions.140 It served as the vehicle for "Just
married" couples, -unless they were walking--, as well as - ironically-- for
transporting the dead to the cemeteries. As bombing attacks became more
frequent, the latter function prevailed over the former. Streetcars were also used
for commercial purposes, such as the transport of general commodities. When
there were trucks available, but without the necessary fuel, trucks were hitched
to

and pulled by streetcars. The shortage of fuel inspired citizens who still

possessed

139

a

private vehicle,

Interview, Ledinegg.
Oesterreich II. pp 39 and 56.

to come

up with their

own

method of

fuel
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production. A wood burning stove, attached to the end of the car, was
sometimes utilized to power these vehicles.
Clean up activities
The devastation after an air attack had to be followed by intensive clean¬
up activities by city workers before regular services could be reinstated. Even if
there was no major bomb damage, there were almost always

minor effects,

such as damages caused by the air pressure of a bomb's detonation

and the

impact of objects of all kinds flying through the air. Cracked furniture and blownout

windows

were

common

occurrences,

although

considered

less

inconvenient than damages to the water canals, water system, gas pipes and
electrical lines.
Canal network and water supply141
One of the worst side effects of the bombings was damage to the water
canal system. Damage also caused

sewage water to overflow into the streets

and sometimes to flood the basements which were used
though about 400 workers from

as

shelters.

Even

14 contracting firms were continuously

employed to repair the canals, new breaks occurred as fast as the old ones
were taken care of. Breaks in canals, including the ones which became
apparent only after the war,

amounted to more than 1600. The water supply

was constantly in danger. Since Vienna received its water from high altitude
sources in the Lower Austrian mountains of the Schneeberg,
Hochschwab, there were numerous targets which could
enemy planes.

Rax and

be bombed by the

Major arteries leading to Vienna, were hit many times but were

always repaired as quickly as possible. Often, when a major pipe or a large

Statistics compiled by Statistics Director, Karl Pospischil, box 82-85, City Archives.
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water container was hit, whole brooks gushed through the streets until the water
could be contained.
On February 21, 1S45, 70% of Vienna's water supply was interrupted, ^
as 160 single incidences of damage were counted. Even though workers
worked day and night to repair

the damage,

the next day Vienna was still

without water. As in similar incidents before, a few old-fashioned water wells still
located in the inner courts of some apartment buildings provided

relief, but

getting the water home was a major task. Karoline Ledinegg recalls many a
day when she went to the well of the Grosse Stadtgutgasse, a few blocks away
from her home:

"People were standing in a long line, with pails of all sizes,
sometimes for hours. It took so long to let a pail down and get it up
again; for some reason the windlass worked only very slowly ;
there wasn't a thing one could do. I remember one woman whose
pail leaked, but it was all she had. I wondered whether she would
have anything left in the pail, by the time she reached home. But
one couldn't buy simple household items; there weren't any in the
stores. And of course, hauling a full water pail back to my place,
then up five flights of stairs, was not pleasant either; but I was
young and strong; the older, weaker people were the ones who
found themselves in dire straits."143

Aid programs
Aside from the regular services the city government provided during the
bombing period, there were numerous programs which aided the citizen in
emergency situations. The ones which dealt specifically with bomb victims have

1,2
113

Ibid.
Interview, Ledinegg.
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been already discussed in a previous chapter. There were also social services,
dealing with the effects of bombing which were run by city officials under the
auspices of the NSV,144 a party organization. The NSV addressed particularly
women and children and ran various programs, such as the
Transportation of children to the countryside.145
Not every citizen was in favor of this rather controversial program, which
was not obligatory. While it was meant to protect children from the air raids by
sending them to the countryside which was generally spared the attacks, the
children were taken from their home by NSV social workers and thus separated
from their mothers. As most men were fighting in the field, mothers held
responsibility for their offspring and resented a separation from their children.
Many also feared unwanted Nazi indoctrination of their children. Those who
entered the program were taken to the country where they lived in

camps run

by the social workers of the NSV who watched over the childrens' every dayactivities such as learning and playing

in a strictly regulated and prescribed

manner, enhanced by frequent singing of Nazi hymns and songs.1,16
There was no question though about

the government's promptness,

efficiency and thoroughness in general. Although considered "routine" in peace
times, these attributes served now as an indication to the citizens that despite
the mayhem caused by the bombing, life could go on as "normally" as possible
and that citizens could always rely on their government to make life bearable. If
they only filled out the right forms, all would be well. In the midst of bombs

National Sozialistische Volks Wohlfahrt = National Socialist Citizens' Welfare.
''' "Kinderlandverschickung," Box 23, National Archives; also: NSV regulation
sheet,11/26/1943/ RD-31/43, group VI, Box 82-5, City Archives.
"'also: Interview, Ledinegg.
5
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raining down on the city, there was a certain security in holding on to the things
that people were used to, even if it was only that of

traditional bureaucracy.

Thus, the regime had its constituents firmly in its hands.
Was there anything left to the citizens? Yes, there was. The population of
Vienna rose to its challenge in many ways and responded to the
period as best as it could; it was a matter of survival.

bombing

CHAPTER 4 : THE POPULATION:
DUTY, DEPENDENCY, DETERMINATION

German men and women!
The homeland knows no greater duty and prouder obligation
than to serve the front! It is the invincible source of strength and
the gigantic arsenal for the Army.147

Whether the citizens agreed with this official propaganda or not, their
lives had become a day-to-day struggle to survive. By necessity, as the war in
the air dragged on, the Viennese found themselves caught in a pattern of
fulfilling

duties, dependent

on services provided by the government, and

forced, at the same time, to rely more and more on their own determination and
skills to survive. These elements of duty, dependency and determination came
to govern the lives of the citizens in the years of bombardment, as inescapable
as the war itself.
With the implementation of the declaration on total war effort, on July 26.
1944, everyday life became harder. A new age-segment of the population was
sent to the front and the "UK"148 status was abolished; men with the birth year of
1906 as well as the ones categorized

"indispensable,"

were conscripted. By

August 8, 1944, even men with a birth year of 1884 were drafted. At the same
time, young males, born in 1928, rather than --as before-1926, were

required

to join the Voikssturm. The rest of the population, while remaining at home, was

147 Excerpt of speech of Hermann Goering, Propaganda Minister. Kleine Wiener Voikszeitunq.
November 20,1939.
14
8 UK = "unabkoemmlich" -- indispensable.
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expected to "sacrifice" more than ever before, and was asked to scale down life
to the barest necessities. It was all in the interest of the war; and it hit

the men

and women of the work force the hardest.
Working conditions for employees and employers changed drastically, in
accordance with the Decree on Total War Effort: The minimum work week was
now, instead of the former forty-eight and a half hours, sixty hours per week. If
more was required at a particular work place, work took place also on Sundays.
If employers didn't fully utilize their work force, they were

to be severely

punished. If, for any reason, a person could not work the long hours, he or she
could petition the Reichsstatthalter for relief. If somebody

was hindered

because of a health condition, he or she had to submit a doctor's confirmation.
Many desk-officials of state offices, such as the forestry and wood-working
bureau, the state nutrition office, and others, were now reassigned to work in
ammunition factories and other war-related firms; personnel directors were
constantly inundated with directives to free their employees for more important
war duties.
"Our work force is our most precious resource and its full utilization is the
goal of our total war,"149 was a phrase employers and employees could

read in

the letter of Reich spokesperson Dr. Stuckart, dated August, 23, 1944. Citizens
were drafted for "emergency obligations,"

which could involve work in

ordinance or transportation factories, like "Simmering-Graz-Pauker,"

or in

"Schanzarbeiten," -digging trenches,which was preparational work for the final
defense of the city.150

150

III a 5275/44/6450.Police Archives.
Akt 5463t /44, box 174, National Archives.
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Some citizens felt the control of the government more than others. If they
were not lucky enough to already have and be retained in a decent job, they did
not have any more freedom in choosing their work than they had in
the

avoiding

bombing. An important device of this control by the government was the

"Arbeitsbuch," the "Work Book," which each worker had to possess.15' The book
served as a statistical account of the labor supply for the government; and each
employee was under obligation to have it instantly ready for inspection of data
relevant to his job.'52 Often it documented

arbitrary removal of citizens,

particularly intellectuals, from their regular position to one of war-related work.
One such case concerns a Vienna priest and music professor who was
commandeered to South Styria in order to dig trenches.153
If anybody dared to object to such an order, he put himself in jeopardy.
Any citizen, who was found working against any clause of the "total war effort,"
would

be

swiftly punished. If it was perceived that the perpetrator caused

particular danger or endangered the security of the Reich, he could be even
punished with a life sentence or with death.154 Nowhere was the inhumanity of
punishment for political reasons revealed more horribly than in the words of
Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler who, in cold bureaucratic lingo,
informed Party officials of one of their collegues' execution who

got his just

punishment for his defeatist remarks," and then signed his name with strokes as
hard and ominous as the cut of an ax.is

151 Behemoth, p 281.
152
Interview, Ledinegg. She also mentioned that one could only get a work book if one first
produced an "Aryan's Proof."
'"Akt 5649/44, Box 174, National Archives.
,5i
Article I of order, August, 25,1944, ibid.
155
Letter Ilia 518944, June 2,1944, # 2998/44, "Miscellaneous,'' Box 383, National Archives.
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In addition to the citizens' duty as a member of the workforce, they also
had the duty to protect themselves, as prescribed by law. Whether they were at
home or at the work place, as soon as they heard the air raid alarm, they were
obliged to trudge obediently to a shelter; a few months into the bombing, this
"duty of self protection"

turned into a kind of conditioned behavior.

"It became routine to do certain things when the air raid alarm sounded,"
Karoline Ledinegg says,156

like grabbing the little suitcase with the important

papers and documents, as well as shutting off gas pilots,157 and leaving a
window cracked. It just made sense." And so it went.
It was drilled into the citizens' minds that following the rules was
advantagious not only for their own survival but also would help them avoid
punishment in the case of negligence; failure to act as required could result in
serious consequences. A Willi Havel was sentenced to three months of prison,
for violating

paragraph 81 of the Code of Law

and paragraph 9 of the Air

Defense Law, for refusing to seek protection in a shelter.13 Apparently, he could
not prove that he fell under the exemption rules, which applied to those on their
way to

important work. Negligence of one's citizenship "duties" could even be

considered as sabotage of the Reich. There existed a set of penalties and fines
for the citizen who disobeyed the air defense laws. Police could arrest people
on the street if they were found there during an air raid;
blackout rules were

violators of

the

not only punished with a monetary fine, but were

threatened with a cut-off of

their electricity.156

,5S interview, Ledinegg.
157
A.BI. S Lu/b I- 5510, Police Archives.
158
Box 151: folder "Miscellaneous" IX,1945, National Archives.
Ibid.
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Since a strong work ethic existed among the population by tradition, the
duty to work was hardly ever questioned. It did not occur to people not to go to
work because of unsafe conditions. Up until the end of the war,

they went to

their places of employment where they continued to perform badly needed
work. Whether it was the repair of streetcars or tracks which were restored as
fast as they were again destroyed, or the delivery of

mail or a public service,

tended to by thousands of postal workers, city employees, and people like the
telephone meter reader, Karoline Ledinegg, or duties performed by office
workers and other professionals, they stuck it out. Some turned to other types of
work, when their own place was destroyed; but all in all, they did it because of
their traditional work ethic, their respect

for

authority and their

desperate

attempt to hold on to something "normal", and the hope that it all would end
eventually.
Added to the citizens' obligations of work under the trying circumstances
of the bombing was

the regimentation of leisure time.1® The Nazi regime

prescribed entertainment and enlightenment in the form of radio, cinema,
newspapers, magazines and sport, all under the control of the propaganda
machine, and infiltrated work places with their social organisations. The
German Labor Front161 created the slogan "Strength through Joy," and staged
efficiency competitions. The infamous

"Arbeit macht Freude," -- Work gives

pleasure," ended up as a motto atop the entrance of concentration camps, and
carried this propaganda ad absurdum.

"" Behemoth, p 349-51.
DAF = Deutsche Arberts Front.

1,1
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While the government received

cooperation from its citizens, it also

made sure that the young were properly prepared and made them subject to
various state programs. All German and Austrian schools were placed under
the domination of the Nazi party.162

The Party, by controlling the educational

system, could indoctrinate children at an early age. Since, traditionally,
education played an
classes

important part in Austria,

steps were taken to continue

during the bombing phase of the war.163

When the air raid sirens

sounded, children under the tutelage of their teachers proceeded in an orderly
fashion to the shelter. Some schools, for all practical purposes, were

moved

underground, as was the University of Vienna. For a time, children were taught
wherever it was safe in shelters, but as fear and chaotic conditions increased,
in the last

months of the war, sessions of regular classes were

possible. By

no longer

Christmas 1944, the daily alarms, frequent attacks and the

especially low temperatures of a harsh winter prompted the authorities to
declare a "cold-vacation," which came to an end only in April 1945 when the
war ended. In addition to their schooling, children were incorporated into the
"Hitler Youth." By executive order of March 25, 1939, a Youth Service Duty for
German youth

between the ages of ten and eighteen was introduced, and by

1943, was made as compulsary as school attendance.161 The law said that
parents who encouraged their children to abstain from this service duty were
punishable, and their children might be taken away from their homes and put
into orphanages or with other families. All organized youth activities, "duties" as

162

William Ebenstein, "Education under Hitler", in H'rtler and Nazi Germany, p 78.

'"Group VI/83, "Report of private persons," statistics director Pospischil, City Archives.
The Youth services were separate for boys and girls, the HJ andtheBDM (Bund
Deutscher Maedchen).
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well as "pleasures", such as sport and music, were

in fact carried out

throughout the whole bombing period.
Dependency
As the citizen obeyed orders and participated in
services,

government-instituted

he became more and more dependent on the regime which had put

him into this situation in the first place. If he was lucky, he never needed
services like rehousing or access to a birth clinic for his pregnant wife, but he
was totally dependent upon the rationing system for food and clothing.
Ironically, the bombing kept citizens dependent on a regime that the air
attacks were trying to destroy; and the bombing only fortified the

population's

dependency on the government. Allied military strategists speculated at one
time that bombing could lead to such demoralization of citizens that they would
turn on their government and sabotage it to the point where the Allies could
easily subdue and conquer the country, thus ending the war.166 But if the Allies
ever hoped that the citizens would rise

against their government, how could

this be done under condition's created by the bombing

when the population

needed the government the most?
Determination
Determination was perhaps the strongest motivation of the population.
This determination was not

restricted to mere physical survival

but included

inventive ways to overcome hardships in the following areas:
the lack of basic household items and food,
the drab every-day life, curtailed from any kind of frills or cultural life,
the often long time spent in shelters during bombing.
'"Chester Wilmot. The Struaoie for Europe. (NewYork: Harper& Row, 1952) , p 550. Also:
Winos of Judgment, p 36.
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Citizens

embraced every opportunity to cut corners and

scrounge

around for the most basic items needed for existence. Once household items
were destroyed, they

usually could not be replaced. Because of the previous

five years' emphasis

on an armament-oriented industry, "peace-items" were

practically non-existent in Austria. There was a shortage of wood, glass,

nails,

and most other every-day items,1® but the improvisations of citizens struggling
to survive were almost limitless. Karoline Ledinegg remembers, "I shared some
thumbtacks with a collegue of mine so she could put up the big sheet of brown
packing paper she had found at a bombing site to replace her
window glass.

shattered

And if one of us could get an extra half pint of milk for the

children, the only glass bottle to pick it up with was carefully washed out and
then used by several other mothers in turn."157
Despite the food rationing system, the goal of which was to prevent later
starvation,

survival on the extremely small ration

portions was almost

impossible and it was no secret that just about all citizens tried with more or less
success to add to their rations through other sources. Those were:168
(1) farming, on the outskirts of the city;
(2) small gardening; about 35,000 people owned diminutive garden
plots,

separate from their

apartment, somewhere in Vienna, all in ail

about ten million square meters. "Amateur farmers" grew fruits and
vegetables, and also raised chickens and rabbits;
(3) "collecting;" citizens would go into the country after the harvest and
collect whatever they could still find on the ground. There were grain
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"Report of private persons," Pospischil, p15, group VI/83, City Archives.
Interview, Ledinegg
'""Statistics," in " Report of private persons," Pospischil, pi 5, group VI/83, City Archives.
167

63

seekers who, after gathering wheat, barley, or other grains, would thresh
it themselves or grind the seeds with coffee grinders, and potato seekers.
"They always carried their booty in a 'Rucksack,' an item as treasured as
the potatoes themselves," says Karoline Ledinegg, "but I did one better: I
got potatoes from a farmer in a small bag, placed it, flattened out, on an
old stroller and spread a blanket over the bag. I then had my small
daughter ride on it, while I pushed the buggy home, over a distance of
about 25 kilometers.",69 Finally, there were berry-, mushroom- and herb
seekers.
(4) vacation-work; people used their

vacation time to work at a farm,

where their salary would be paid in food. This method was legal;
(5) buying of groceries in addition to rations. This took place, of course,
on the black market, which was illegal;
(6) bartering; this was also illegal but despite of that, everything that
could be moved was exchanged for food. Clothes, sewing machines,
even pianos were hauled to the country;
(7) food packages; if one had an acquaintance on a farm, he would try to
obtain little extras. Says Karoline Ledinegg: "I don't know what I would
have done without my foster brothers in Styria; they sent me ham, lard,
even eggs, by mail, which always arrived whole; only rarely, one or two
would be cracked."170
As if the daily struggle for the basics was not enough, the implementation
of the total war effort brought yet another hardship with major implications on

,6S
170

Interview, Ledinegg.
Interview, Ledinegg.
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the people: the curtailing of cultural life.'71
shortages,

Even though a war brings with it

sacrifices and losses, the American bombing only served to

reinforce Hitler's notion on citizens of the need for a total war effort. According to
this notion, by sacrificing even the last amenity left, the citizens could show the
aggressors that they could carry on with their lives, and that every sacrifice they
made in terms of material and human resources would only enhance means to
conquer the enemy.
That was the theory. Reality for the citizens looked slightly different: a little
entertainment went a long way to sustain people's spirit. To give up

that and

other elements of their lives which were ingrained with culture was one of the
worst blows citizens suffered. Many blamed these conditions on the Americans
and their bombing: "There was a marked difference in our lives, once the
bombing started regularly," Karoline Ledinegg remembers.172 "Before the
bombing, despite the usual wartime shortages, life pretty much resembled
peacetime, but the bombing put everybody and everything under its spell."
In 1944, the measure which ordered the closing of theaters, concert halls
and places of entertainment

was presented to the mayor of Vienna, Herr

Blaschke, in the form of a letter from a party official, a Dr. Benecke from Berlin:

Dear friend,
Reductions in cultural life have been decided upon by the Fuehrer
personally. Suggested by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, the Fuehrer has
ordered the closing of all theaters. In old friendship, Heil Hitler! Your Otto
Benecke.173

171 A collection of letters and orders pertaining to the curtailing of cultural life, in box 341,
National Archives.
'"Interview, Ledinegg.
173
Box 341, National Archives.
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This was a move looked upon with alarm by many

citizens, who had

always considered cultural activities an important aspect of their lives. But the
sacrifice and dissappointment was not entirely theirs; those who actively
provided for the cultural activities, felt harrasserf as well. An official executive
order proclaimed that all men and women belonging to the Reich Culture
Chambers or associations

and all other persons who were now free from their

professional obligations after the closing of theaters

were required to report to

the unemployment office by Sept 15,1944.17i Many Burg Theater actors or
Vienna State Opera stars found themselves following an invitation to the
unemployment office and pondering the

directions of yet another form to be

filled out in accordance with the above directive, which reassured them

that

"unemployed citizens can declare for which employment they consider
themselves particularly able." Those refusing could be "forcibly brought" to the
unemployment office and

punished by prison and a monetary fine.

The second level of "cultural" closings involved some simple restaurants
and coffee houses. Following this, the mayor of Vienna suggested self service
and a simplification of menu items in the remaining establishments,175 ironically
so,

it seems, because there wasn't much variety of food

to begin with. By

October, 1944, all entertainment establishments were closed;176 public dancing
("Tanzlustbarkeiten") was to cease "until further notice," as proclaimed by
Heinrich

Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS,

and finally, even the use of

libraries was ordered reduced ("lending necessities" were permitted.) There

,7

' # 40 (part I) , 4th order, Berlin, 8/31/1944, box 341, National Archives.
Abt. A 1-58111/44, 9/8/1944, box 341, National Archives.
17e
Order, October 3, 1944, and order O-VuR. R. I! 1749/39, box 341, National Archives.
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was one exception: cinemas were still allowed to remain open. They served
propaganda, as movies produced under Nazi supervision

were cleverly used

in an attempt to brainwash citizens into becoming followers.
With no "entertainment" left to possibly interfere with the war effort, the
people had to oblige with more work; what else could they do? They might have
been only vaguely aware that even the Fuehrer himself got to taste the fruits of
equal suffering. At an invitation to tea in the house of Josef Goebbels and his
wife, he presented Frau Goebbels with " a modest bunch" of lilies-of-the-valley,
and explained that

it was "the best that could be found, because Doctor

Goebbels had closed all the flower shops in Berlin."177
Again and again, officials repeatedly hammered into citizens' heads that
if they would

only sacrifice everything mundane and focus their energies

toward one goal only, namely the promotion of the war effort, the war would be
eventually won. Furthermore, the citizens would survive to see it happen. The
population's determination to cope with the bombing brought forth human
survival traits.

People often took their own initiatives,

government could not give them --hope, faith and

using what the

love for their fellow

neighbors. Tenants of apartment houses became aware that they were a
community and could overcome obstacles more easily with everybody's
cooperation; as the bombings increased and the shelters were frequented with
greater regularity, the inhabitants

took steps to make basements more

"livable."178 Regulations aside, many people thought of ways to make living in
basements easier. An empty coal

177

box, for example,

Struggle of Europe, pp 174-5.
"'"Survivors' accounts," group VI, box 82-5, City Archives.

was perfect for storing
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emergency items in the form of cans and bottles or jugs with water. One very
practical container which was stuffed with survival items was the "German
Rucksack," made of strong tent material, which could be easily picked up and
carried around, in case of a quick flight.
As the war neared the end and bombardments increased from day to
day, more and more meals had to be taken in basements. To prepare them,
tenants brought small wood-burning ovens or petroleum cookers with them. By
contributing whatever food items they could scratch up, they created in the
process "culinary war-time delights," which became known as the "community
goulash, " the "war cake," and the "potato cake." Even Mrs. Goebbels herself, in
a radio broadcast, revealed her recipe for a soup, made from potato peels.173
Karoline Ledinegg remembers another "fine specialty" from the final
phase of the war when the system of

rationing cards went astray.At the

beginning of April 1945, when the Soviets were already in Vienna, bombs and
artillery fire

made the people hover in their cellars continuously for the second

straight week, and food was getting frightfully scarce. Two tenants who had
restlessly strayed outside in the neighboring streets brought back some
unexpected "booty:" sticking out of pails were the raw parts of a horse, its blood
still dripping and forming a puddle on the ground. The dead animal had been
left on the street, after fierce street battles with the Soviets."1®
There were countless other occasions during which the citizens had to
make quick and important decisions and rely on their own
their determination

to survive.

"'Ibid.
""Interview, Ledinegg.
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Many episodes of cooperation among

total
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strangers and

displays of loyalty to

occurred. When the Opera House

neighbors as well as their home city

was destroyed, famous opera stars were

seen cleaning up and scratching through the debris in order to retrieve and
preserve notes, instruments and

precious costumes. Against all odds, the

Viennese opera singer Ernst Majkut, together with two other employees of the
House, dragged a grand piano down the main staircase in order to save it.181
In their struggle to overcome the hardship of the bombing, the Viennese
population resigned themselves to the fact that it was after all war; but while the
targeting of industrial sites and even housing areas could be
justified to a certain degree, the destruction of cultural

considered

institutions, as well as

schools, churches and hospitals, was much harder to digest. If the damages of
homes as well as industrial and transportation sites, --all existing railway
stations were either damaged or destroyed by the end of the

war-182

were

tragic and disturbing, the Viennese population was shocked by the destruction
of some of the great cultural institutions of the city.183
To see the magnificent royal castles of Schoenbrunn and Belvedere, the
precious

palaces of Schwarzenberg, Kaunitz and Harrach, and great

monuments, such as the Kunsthistorische Museum and the Burg Theater,
destroyed and mutilated, filled the people with rage, sadness and disbelief.
Aside from their own personal losses, that was what they questioned the most.
Who was served by the obliteration of treasures which provided enjoyment and
elevation for the whole world? What could be the motive for such a thing?

"" "Reports of private persons," "Personal accounts," box 82-5, City Archives.
Report of Chief of Statistical Office, p. 10, box 82-5, City Archives.
e3
' as expressed by the Chief of Statistical Office, ibid. Also: Finale, p 169, Oesterreich II. pp
44-5, and "Reports of private persons," "Personal accounts," box 82-5, City Archives.
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One early heavy air attack, on September 10, 1944, directed mostly
towards the center of the city, was described by the (Nazi controlled) press as
the result of the

"attacker's desire to hit culturally precious buildings and thus

transform the most beautiful squares of Vienna into a crater landscape and to
create in the city as much mayhem as possible."1sa Even though this diction was,
of course, motivated in part by the hatreds engendered by Nazi propaganda,
there was no other explanation for the population. In the center of the city, there
were no factories or railroads, only monumental buildings which were well
known to the world.
have done,"

"The Americans

the paper concluded its

accounts described

probably do not fully realize

what they

article on that day. However, American

bombing attacks only in terms of

material and numbers;

the fact that cultural monuments were being hit was not mentioned.185
Indeed, on that day, whole street blocks were heavily damaged, making
the faces of many old houses under preservation protection disappear.The
Viennese mourned the loss of some of their beautiful palaces, like the Harrach,
which received a full hit, the Pasqualatti House, in which Beethoven had lived,
and the "Dreimaederl Haus," scene of Schubert's activities. In addition, beautiful
baroque churches were

destroyed, some located

in the suburbs which were

equallv hit. To see artifacts and altar pictures scattered around on the streets
and throughout the ruins, was a horrible sight.
As on every other day after air attacks, the citizens attended to
clean-up work. "The population

copes with

the disaster," the

same

their
paper

observed, "as if it is something unavoidable ... a senseless crime, committed to

'^Neues Wiener TaoesblatC# 251 .September 11,1944, p 3, c 2,3.
From September 10,1944, Combat Chronology, p 447.
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a city which has resisted the Turks and many other menaces." The bombings
resumed the next day, again on Vienna's "cultural estate," and

the press

reported, "Never have the terror attacks displayed their atrocious senselessness
more than here."186
The most infamous of all attacks on Vienna's cultural heritage took place
on March 12, 1945 when the Vienna State Opera, famed and treasured all over
the world, took a bad hit.167

The

seven-story high

ceiling coilapsed, the

auditorium and

stage burned, with

flames shooting high into the sky. Word

spread quickly

of the disaster, and citizens hurried to the site in disbelief.

Karoline Ledinegg had sat close-by in a shelter, after having been denied
entrance to the Philippi Hof, which lay now in ruins, and hurried back up the
street when the "all-clear" sign came. "Some

people tried to help the fire

brigade, some were just standing in front of the

blazing flames, in shock and

with tears running down their faces," she said. "I cried too; and I had never even
been inside the Opera House."1®
The Viennese opera singer, Ernst Majkut, describes vividly the disaster of
the stricken opera house in his diary.After actively participating in saving what
could be saved from the burning house, such as the red and gold plush seats
from the auditorium, precious costumes, about 250 pieces of sheet music, and
the grand piano, which he helped push down the front stair case, he went home
and cried in the arms of his wife. "I have lost ail faith in the beautiful," he wrote in
his diary, "through this bottomless barbarism."1®
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'"Interview, Ledinegg.
1 s
® Letter 830-74/56 to "Reports of private persons," group VI, Box 82-5, City Archives.
7

71

Whether it was barbarism, ignorance, indifference, or even indolence, as
the bombing of the Opera House has been called,

or a combination of all of

that, the precise reason why the Opera House was bom bed cannot be
pinpointed. One rumor had it that the House had been mistaken for the South
Railway Station because of its long stretched metallic roof.190 The American
sources are mum with regard to the destruction of the opera house; neither the
15th Army-Air Force, throughout its Directive, accounts for the bombing of anyother than industrial objects, nor does the Combat Chronoloov

mention the

famous building hit on that particular day.19' "Whatever the reasons were," says
Karoiine Ledinegg, "it was an inexcusable deed:"192
As the citizens were inundated more and more not only with the bombing
but also with the propaganda against its "barbarism," they came to appreciate
the precautions the city government had taken to protect as many monuments
and historical treasures as possible.193 Statues and monuments were enclosed
in

cement cases, glass mosaic windows were removed from churches,

and

valuable treasures from museums and castles were transported to secret hiding
places in the country. One such location was the salt mines of Bad Aussee in
the Salzkammergut.194 An area of 40,000 square meters, it was efficiently used
to

accommodate

precious

loads

containing

church figurines,

altars,

furniture, pictures and whole art collections, even complete libraries and
archives. Everything was carefully covered with blankets and transported by
"° Oesterreich II pp 44-5. Also: Finale, p 169.
Combat Chronology, p 597.
82
' Interview, Ledinegg.
Oesterreich II. p 40.
'"Erich Poechmueller. Well -Kunstschaetze in Gefahr. (Salzburg: Pallas Verlag, 1948) , pp 549. Poechmueller was the director of the Bad Aussee mine and overlooked personally storage
activities as well as communicated with directors of various art institutions.

72

means of trains, trucks and sleighs. Various

caves were chosen because of

their ideal security as well as climatic conditions

(steady temperature

and

humidity.) The accomodation of such delicate artifacts was not an easy
undertaking. Because of continuous daytime bombing, transport took place
mostly in the night, and an alert crew had to overcome the obstacles of
destroyed

tracks and

railway stations. The storage of sometimes odd-sized

items into low-height spaces required imagination as well as practical sense.
But at the end of the war, none of the stored articles had been

lost.

Thanks to their conscientious city government, the Viennese could retrieve all
their treasures, complete with XVII-century furniture, jewelry collections and the
legacies of Rubens, Vermeer, Van Dyck, Rembrandt and Velasquez, as well as
treasures saved from other countries, (some confiscated from Italy by retreating
German troops) such as the artifacts of Monte Cassino, and the Naples
Museum's "The Blind," by Peter Brueghel.
The extraordinary dimensions of the Austrian treasure-saving operation
in the face of American bombing are truly mind-boggling:195 All in all, eighty
wagons of art treasures with a value of $ 3-1/2 billion (1946) were put in
storage; and what was more it was all
minute to blow

saved despite the Nazis' wish in the last

everything up in the wake of their downfall. Even though the

American bombardment destroyed

countless

treasures in the city of Vienna

itself, it could not touch the Austrian emperor's crown, Van Eyck's Ghent altar
painting and the Mona Lisa.
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"5 Aussenminister Gruber und Minister Kommittee, Rot-Weiss-Rot-Buch. Darstellunqen,
Dokumente und Nachweise zur Voroeschichte und Geschichte der Okkupation
Oesterreichs.Erster Tell. (Vienna: Oesterreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1946) , pp 147-9.
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If the Viennese appeared to fret too much over their art treasures,
palaces

and Opera House, it must be oointed out that they were just as

outraged over the bombing of kindergartens, hospitals and churches. Towards
the last months of the war, when Vienna was subjected to almost daily bombing
attacks, the second district, adjacent to the inner city (the first district) took heavy
blows. They resulted, in addition to an almost total wipe-out of whole blocks, in
the damaging of the Kindergarten on Obere Augartenstrasse and the oldest
hospital, not only of the district but the whole city, as well as the historic St.
Leopold Church.197
The helpless, bewildered children of the stricken Augartenstrasse
Kindergarten were not any better off than patients in hospitals who,
bogged down

with adversities

had to be collected

already

in beds, gurneys and

wheelchairs to be taken down to the basement, where intravenous devices,
heart monitors and operation room equipment had to be accommodated. The
downed bomber pilot Parker, himself recuperating in the Vienna Robert Koch
Hospital and empathizing with his fellow patients --"five stories of bed-ridden
humanity,"--1® gave an account of such an attack:

Sixty-nine bombs landed in the hospital complex, killing many people,
including eleven Catholic sisters who were nurses. . . Our hospital was
located about one quarter mile from the Suedbahnhof rail yard. . . One
500 pounder hit our five story building with the debris completely
blocking the one exit from the air raid cellar, trapping two hundred people
for hours until they could dig us out.1®
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If the bombardiers mistook the Opera House's roof for that of a railway
station, they couldn't claim the same mistake here. Hospitals had a large cross
painted on their roofs, complying with rules of the

Geneva Convention. "Birth

clinic as bomb target," was the caption of a picture

appearing in the

newspaper,333 showing the complete destruction of what was once a hospital.
And it

went on to say,

"The bombs of the American air gangsters have hit a

birth clinic. The ruins, together with all the other destroyed hospitals and
schools, cultural premises and churches, serve as an accusation for the
enemy's bomb

terror." Even if the phrasing can be attributed to the typical

rhetoric of Nazi propaganda, the photograph of the destruction of the

hospital

was realistic enough to play on the resentment of the Viennese population.
There is no evidence that cultural and medical institutions were hit out of
barbarism

or revenge,-- but instead, most Viennese assumed that many of

these targets were hit by mistake.201

While the bombers aimed at armament

factories, oil refineries and railroad tracks,

some bombs missed their targets

and fell on housing areas, "whole bomb-carpets of it."22 Reasons for this were
either navigational errors, technical

malfunctions,

insufficient information, and/or a combination of some

weather conditions,
of these factors. When

"Lone Wolves" bomber pilots followed their standing orders, requiring them to
return to base when certain visual conditions were encountered,

they often

dropped their load indiscriminately before going home, or if a target could not

;o
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be approached, bombs were dropped because the crew did not want to take the
load back to the base.203
Larry Babits,2"

"They didn't always know what they were hitting " said
reading from his 15th AAF pilot

father's

entrances into a war journal which

described day-to-day missions. "Often, in Austria," he said, "weather conditions
were such that targets were not always visible." And, says

Karl Pospischii,

"Particularly towards the end of the war, it didn't seem to matter much anymore,
one way or the other.205
The weather in Austria was known to be unstable, particularly over the
Alps. On the infamous day that the Opera was hit, however,

conditions were

described as "good weather."206
The statistics about the damage to cultural buildings207
1944/1945,

show that in

all concert halls and theaters, as well as libraries and book stores,

museums, exhibition hails and art institutes, were damaged. In addition, of 421
schoolhouses 67 were totaly destroyed, and 119 heavily
damaged. Of 220 cinemas, only 120 could

and 235 slightly

be used again after the war; of 400

city gyms, only 75 survived, as did 50 of the 100 athletic fields; of

60 public

baths 23 were heavily, 20 slightly damaged.
In their daily struggle of

survival

citizens learned to observe duties

which gave them aid and sometimes comfort. In many instances they had no
choice but to depend on their government. They also knew when to depend on
203
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each other and use their own initiatives, thus overcoming many obstacles that in
their pragmatism they recognized as inherent. They could understand war, but
the destruction of

cultural monuments distressed them particularly because

they could not understand the reasons for it.

Determination to overcome

obstacles helped many citizens in the end to survive.

Chapter 5: NUTRITION AND HEALTH

it is of utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize
that . . . Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to
death, but . . . The Fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and
individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to
start any new war. . .208

While the rationing of food is a common war measure as an early means
to prevent famine, the start of regular bombing of Vienna brought a significant
urgency to the government's programs.
The waning military successes of the Axis and the renewed bombing of
German cities had contributed to Hitler's declaration of a total war effort. This
new phase had an

impact also on the question of nutrition and other health

matters. In Vienna, due to the continuous interruption of the transportation
network, the supply and distribution of goods became more and more difficult.
As the American bombing put out of action more and more roadways, railway
tracks and vehicles, all rationing was severely affected.
The rationing system for food supplies.209
The rationing program went into effect for the whole Reich at
beginning of the war, September 1,1939;

the

the food-loving Viennese population

deemed it inadequate almost from the beginning.210 After only two months into
208 President Roosevelt to Secretary of Defense Stimson, Wings of Judgment, p 88.
209 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the
German Economy (New York: Overall Economic Effects Division, 1945), pp 264-290.
210 Karl Stadler, Oesterreich 1938-1945. Im Spiegel der NS-Akten (Vienna: Herold.l 966), pp
131-2.
77
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the war, shortages of rationed amounts required citizens to stand in long lines in
front of grocery stores. On October 13,1939, housewives lining up in front of a
fish store on the Mariahilferstrasse were hauled away in police
protest,

for violating a

law against

cars, under

standing in line. Nazi officials had only

recently created this law in an attempt to deny unfavorable conditions.
According to a

report by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD)211 from November 6,

1939, there was a shortage of fruits and vegetables causing Viennese citizens
to suspect that the goods were distributed to the German homeland only. And
again, in December, 1939, housewives complained that the six supplementary
eggs that were authorized for Christmas were withheld from
week's

the previous

regular ration.
These initial problems were only an indication of what was still to come

once the bombing started. Obviously, the American bombing phase made it
more acute because of the vulnerability of industries and the transportation
system. How much the prolonged and successful Allied bombing affected the
nutrition of the population as a whole is shown by a statement of Goebbels, of
March 1, 1945:

"We are already forced to make extraordinarily severe reductions
in the food rations and shall soon be compelled to make even
more. . . . We shall very soon be forced to reduce by 35-50 % the
ration of the most important items, fat and bread.?12

Though the Nazis'

extensive rationing system

population's needs, in the end it justified itself as

211
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avoided. The bureaucratic organization and the ingrained discipline of the
population, once again, were the means which helped

the population survive.

Operation213
The highest authority in charge of food supply was the Reichsrninisterium
fuer Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft (Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture)
and the Reichsnaehrstand (Reich Food Estate,) the former having control over
policy and administration and the latter over executing agrarian policy. During
the war the Reichsnaehrstand operated under the supervision of the Ministry
which in turn was subordinated to the Ministerial Council for the defense of the
Reich.

These two organizations were in charge of

enforcing regulations on

production, sales and distribution of agricultural products, including

price

controls.
The Food Estate whose director was also the Minister of Food and
Agriculture,

was

subdivided

into provincial,

district

and

local

farmers

associations; the latter were in charge of deliveries of agricultural produce from
the peasants. Also under the Food Estate were Central Marketing Associations
at the national level, the purpose of which was to regulate and tax the
movement of agricultural goods. There were Central Marketing Associations for
grain and fodder, milk and fats, eggs, livestock, potatoes, sugar, garden
products, vineyard products, fish, and the brewery and confectionary industries.
The Associations dealt in domestic trade only. Imported food was controlled by
Reich offices which took care of tariffs, storage and marketing .
Germany, including Austria, provided 83 percent of its food needs at the
beginning of the war. The average citizen consumed 2200-2400 calories per
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day, according to the State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Food & Agriculture,
but the production possibilities had reached their limit and any decrease

had

a noticeable effect on the nutritional status of the population. Large industrial
cities depend on supplies from

rural areas and a good transportation system.

Therefore, the bombing of rail- and waterways and oth.r transportation facilities
had

important negative consequences. Aerial bombing made the operation of

food processing industries more difficult. The only measures that could be taken
were the rerouting of loads to other, still operational facilities and the
construction of new plants.
Storage
The air war also damaged storage facilities, another important link in the
chain of food supply. Reserve food stocks and certain foods in short supply were
destroyed as was the necessary power for refrigeration. An incident in Germany
provides an illustration:^ the "Linde Kuehlhaus" refrigerated plant of Munich
was hit by an incendiary bomb which destroyed approximately 2,000,000 eggs,
400,000 kg of butter and 100,000 kg of meat. To counteract occurrences like
this, the Ministry of Food ordered greater decentralization of facilities, but the
proper functioning of facilities was still very dependent on transportation and on
power supply. Official American assessment later concluded that the damage
to the

bombarded citizens' food supply and

distribution system, was

"extensive, but not alone sufficient to upset the food economy structure."^5

'"The Effects of Strategic Bombinc p27i.
The Effects of Strategic Bombing po 271-2. Even though this statement derived from both
American and German estimates, it appears to be rather a matter of doubt, considering the further
described circumstances of the food sitatuation.
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Distribution216
A major task of the Ministry of Food was to direct the distribution of food
staples (flour, sugar, fat, etc.) uniformly and to ensure an adequate food supply
to each consumer, allowing the rationing system to provide

allowances of the

principal foods at intervals of four weeks. Each consumer received rationing
cards with designated stubs which were given to the grocer in return for the
portions.
The destruction of railroads, bridges and terminal facilities, was the
biggest single factor in the disruption of the food distribution and

prompted a

shift from water- and railways to road transportation, but the size of loads was of
course cut down. In 1942, at Goebbels' order, an Interrninisterial Air War
Damage Committee (Interministerieller Luftkriegsschaecenausschuss, or LKA)
was formed to consolidate calls by cities for assistance after air raids. The LKA
was to make available

emergency food supplies for communal feeding in the

case of a city's inability to take care of its citizens. An elaborate chain of
command was to come into operation: the food ministry representative on the
committee advised the Central Marketing Association to give orders to the
appropriate Provincial Marketing association. The liason official in the Ministry
of Food then asked the rail and transportation authorities for the necessary
shipment of food to bombed cities. Similarly, the NSV transferred extra food
supplies to Municipal Food Offices after an air attack and would try to restore the
normal food supply within three days after the raid. But by February, 1945, the
transport situation had become so severe that the Ministry could only send food
to a bombed city from the surrounding province.

'"The Effects of Slrategic Bombing, po 272-4.
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The Ministry operated

the Food Rationing System by basing its

calculations on a lood balance sheet from month to month.217 For the purpose of
establishing needs the civilian population was divided into several consumer
groups, according to age and occupation.

But allowances were decreased as

the war went on and towards the end hit starvation levels. Children, nursing and
pregnant women got extra rations, on the basis of "standards laid down by the
national health organization."218 The rations were based on general availability
and on national dietary habits rather than on nutritional values. While calories,
protein and fat content were periodically calculated, mineral

and vitamin

contents were never considered.
Continuing diminuation of the available food
reduction of rations until

in November 1944,

resulted in gradual

when reductions reached

a

critical stage, particularly for the "normal consumer" group. By the beginning of
1945, with

the even higher frequency of bombing, the basic principles of

rationing had to be abandoned altogether and a reduced version of the ration
cards was introduced in April of that year. At the end of the war the average
Austrian citizen consumed only 1200 calories per day.219
In Vienna,

the NSV was an important organization in the distribution of

food to bombed-out citizens. Shortly after an air attack, members of

this

organization would distribute "Eintopf," a single dish meal, bread and hot
substitute coffee at central locations, or directly at the bombing location. As the
surviving population spent an increasing number of hours in air raid bunkers,
especially during the last few months of the war, they found it necessary to
; 7
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provide for tneir own makeshift kitchen facilities. In the final phase of the war,
during the siege of Vienna, when the population spent almost two consecutive
weeks in shelters, people

had to use their own initiatives to procure and

process food. Tenants brought their petroleum burners or even started
wood fires on the floor of the basement; and

small

by pooling together food

ingredients they could still come up with, they continued to cook "community
meals ".2aa
Quality of the national diet2*1
A ration was determined by weight rather than nutritional value, but there
was a list in the Ministry citing

reduced human nutritional requirements for

calories, protein, fat and carbohydrates, which could be approximated under
war conditions. According to the American survey, no firm conclusion can be
drawn22 on the total effect of strategic bombing concerning food supplies in an
enemy country. The bombing of food processing and storage locations, as well
as transportation, certainly curtailed the German and Austrian people's diet
even though it cannot be stated in exact terms to what extent the destruction of
these particular targets contributed to the final defeat of the enemy. What can be
definitely established is that the bombing contributed to the shortage of food.
Supplements223
There also existed an elaborate list of special supplements which
consisted of a few addtional foods and vitamin concentrates for sick citizens or
pregnant women. For example, pregnant and nursing women could receive a
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half a liter of milk (about a pint) per day, plus 125 grams (about 4oz) of butter per
week. Interestingly, the Reich Midwife Association was allowed by the Ministry
of Food to distribute 20 grams (about 3/4 oz) of roasted coffee for each woman
in labor, "as a stimulant."224 Another

supplement program

was the "Vitamin

Aktion" of the Ministry of the Interior, which issued Viamin C in the form of lemon
flavored sugar tablets containing 50mg, later in 1943, 30mg, of synthetic
ascorbic acid, to school children for 3 consecutive months. Interestingly, the
importance of vitamins was considered greatly overrrated and potatoes were
seen as

sufficient sources of vitamin C. General vegetables were to provide

vitamin A. Vitamins, by the way, were never rationed.
The system of rationing cards was designed in such a way that the
average citizen was expected to be adequately nourished.

But it was no secret

in Vienna that just about everyone tried with more or less success to augment
his rations through other sources;

in addition,

the government provided

supplementary programs, such as
"Erntelandaktion" -- harvest garden program
Participants of this state-run program planted vegetables and potatoes
on small garden plots which the city provided --all in all, 10 million square
meters. From one square meter one could

harvest about two kilos of

vegetables or potatoes.
Public vegetable gardens
The city of Vienna even planted vegetable gardens in some public parks
which were regularly tended to by city employees.

One of the better known

ones was on the Heldenplatz, a very large square, which displayed rows and

i he Effects of Strategic Bombing, p. 282.
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rows of potato plants. It was also

the square from which Hitler, a few years

earlier, had entered the Hofburg's Office of the Chancellor.226
"Lebensmittelzusatzkarten" -Grocery supplement tickets
All during the war and the bombing period, about 900,000 "Zusatzkarten"
were used in addition to the regular ones, which provided, except for the last
phase of the war, extra calories for certain groups of the population:
GROUPS OF THE POPULATION EXTRA CALORIES
"Heavy" Laborers
Laborers

1250
650

"Regular" employees

200

Pregnant and nursing mothers

1250

Sick (under doctors' care)

1250

Rations for special assignment workers
People with special assignments such as in the "Ernteeinsatz" -harvest
assignment-- received rations according to a special order from the Reich
Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture, who termed the harvest assignment as
"very important for the securement of nutrition for the German nation," and
"necessary for the success of

the'battle for nutrition' and

for

guaranteeing

nutrition for the front as well as home."226
"There were still many people who, for various reasons, fell through the
cracks," says Karoline Ledinegg. "Older people, for example, couldn't be as
enterprising in their quest of augmenting allocated food rations; many babies
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and small children lacked special nutrients and therefore suffered from
malnutrition; one from our apartment house even died."227
Supplies of food decreased as the war and the bombing dragged on.
According

to a Nazi official,25 a secret press conference was held in January

1945, in which a spokesman for the NS Farmer Association spoke about

the

acute problem of food supply. There existed a plan to mobilize all reserves and
even slaughter all stock. Wheat could not be transported anymore

because of

total lack of fuel. "With regard to nutrition," the official reported, "the war is
already lost." On March 1, 1945, Goebbels wote in his diary:

. . . [the rations] will fall below the tolerabie minimum subsistence
level. In some cases reductions must be made straight away, in
others we can allow ourselves until 9 April. One can imagine what
the effect on the public will be. Even if we reconquer our eastern
territories we shall not avoid severe shortages; hunger will be
added to all our people's miseries.But, as we know, in this struggle
there is nothing except to try to hold out bravely.23

Interestingly, according to Karoline Ledinegg,230

there were two food

items that were never rationed; they were cabbages and parsnips.
Clothing
Issue cards231
Obtaining

enough clothing was as difficult as getting enough food.

Clothing was obtained legitimately only with a "Bezugschem" --"issue card,"
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resembling

the ration card for groceries. It was just as scarce,

as

its supply

depended on bomb-beleaguered transportation and, furthermore, only warrelated items were allowed to be produced. It was not unusual for a desperatecitizen to resort to petition a government official for extra help. For example, in
January 1943, a Dr. Reinhart from the Main Economics Office, agreed to help a
Heinrich Paletz to acquire a suit.
For special situations, a "Zusatzkleiderkarte"

--"auxiliary clothes ticket"

and/or a "Zusatzschuhkarte" --"auxiliary shoe ticket" could be issued with which
a citizen could buy work clothes and a good pair of shoes, as was required in
the Harvest Assignment.22
Clothes collections233
The civilian population was not alone in facing a lack of clothing, the
armed forces suffered from shortages also. To help, the population was
encouraged to collect and donate used textiles in all forms. As everything else
in the Reich, the big propaganda machine promoted this activity and coined the
catch word "Volksopfer" --"national sacrifice." Towards the end of 1944, more
than 100,000 tons of raw material for clothing was needed for uniforms for the
Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm, but also for the requirements of victims of the air
raids, and for baby and infant clothing."
Despite the citizens' own need, the collection of yarn, underwear and
clothing in

1944 resulted in 36,000 tons. According to a

Party letter from

December 27, 1944, a much larger donation was now needed. A new call went
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out for old spinning material, used underwear, and clothing and uniforms of all
kinds. From the Fuehrer Fleadquarters, Martin Bormann, head of the Volkssturm,
ordered on behalf of the Fuehrer the preparation and carrying out of the
donation, to take place during a three-week period in January 1945, by officials
of the NSDAP. He emphasized that the carrying out of the donation was of '"wardecisive" importance and was expected by the Fuehrer to be 'mastered' by the
party along with everything else."
Sport
Bormann had orders from the Fuehrer to pursue another "health matter"
throughout the Reich: sport. On March 9, 1943, in a special order to Nazi
officials, Borman wrote:

Concerning sporting events during the war: physical exercise is
essential for the war and is to be enforced vigorously. . . Sporting events
are to be organized in the form of competitions, but only regionally, not
nationally or internationally. Signed, Martin Borman.23"

Not too many adults were interested in sport by the time bombing began.
"After

the bombing had already started," Karoline Ledinegg remembers, " my

boss wanted to set up a

track and field team consisting of

meter-reader-

women, but we protested, reminding him that racing to the shelters and hunting
down streetcars was enough to keep us fit."26
For the youth in schools and

Nazi Youth organizations, sport was

a

major part of their activities. It enforced the illusion that despite the bombing, life
was "normal."
"4 R.BI. 16/1943, Box 174, State Archives.
Interview, Ledinegg.
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Disposal of the dead236
A

peculiar health

problem,

heavily

influenced

by tho

bombinc,

pariicuiariy towards the end of the war, was the disposal of the dead. Because
of

inadequate transportation facilities, corpses were stored in neighborhood

churches, coffee houses and movie theaters, where they were then picked up
by a newly adapted contraption, the "casket street car."257
Passenger

seats were replaced with compartments which looked like

large, open safety deposit boxes, and after the pick-up at the collection points,
the caskets or -- following the complete destruction of Vienna's casket factory in
the bombing attack of February 13, 1945-- the mere bodies, wrapped in paper
or cardboard,

could then be neatly filed into them. With its macabre load,

carrying sometimes up to 60 corpses,--the vehicle was sent on its

--

route in the

pitch-black night. Since black-out times were in effect, and few ventured out
voluntarily at this time, very few citizens ever saw the casket streetcar; it was not
a feature conducive to

the uplift of

spirit the Nazi propaganda so urgently

demanded.
When the largest city cemetery, the Zentralfriedhof in the outer district of
Simmering, was hit, in March 1945,

it only highlighted the difficulties of the

city's burial department. This came at a time when funeral activities were at a
height and transportation had been already badly interrupted. Many bodies
could only be buried in mass graves. To keep this from happening to their loved
ones, some citizens buried them in backyards and public parks. The Viennese
actor, director and producer of Metropolitan Opera productions, Otto Schenk,
236
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remembers how he, then a young boy, together with his mother, buried his
grandmother in the Volksgarten, a park that is now abundant with beautiful
roses.238
Because corpses could not

be accommodated anymore by the

government they were openly piled up inside and outside the cemetery church.
During

the siege of Vienna, there were 5000 dead bodies lying around.230

During these last months of the war, some citizens tried to help themselves by
acquiring a casket on the black market, building one themselves, tying the
corpse to a wooden

board and even wrapping it in paper. Throwing a shovel

across their shoulder, they trecked to the cemetery and dug a grave themselves
so that their relative or friend

did not have to be buried in a mass grave.

Because of the air raids, they often couldn't make it on time to the burial if one
did take place. In that case, all that was left to do for them was take the little
piece of paper that was handed to them, describing the row and number of the
grave.

"a Oesterreich !l. p 56.
The author of Oesterreich II interviewed a gravedigger of that time, Johann
Kuessenpfennig, p 56.

CHAPTER 6: BOMBARDMENT FROM WITHIN: THE PROPAGANDA

All compatriots form a "community of fate"-- who have to cling to
each other in life and death ... If everybody does the right thing,
the enemy will not reach its goal which is to bring disorder to the
economy and confusion to the population. A nation which carries
within it an iron will for self preservation, will resist successfully the
dangers from the air. Heil to the Fuehrer! Heil to Germany! Signed:
Goering.240

The phrase of the "community of fate" was one of several slogans such
as the catchy

"soldier of the home-front," the "iron will," and

Fatherland and fate, that

served as

links in a

chain of

speeches about
powerful phrases

intended to motivate the population to resist the enemy^ Thus, trying to survive
in the midst of all the

problems brought on by the bombing, the population

found itself with yet another head of the hydra to chop off. It could be called the
bombardment from within; it was the Nazi propaganda machine.
As it rapid-fired into the citizen's homes and public places, it used as its
ammunition spoken and written communication in
run press,
used

and public address systems

fear and terror, and thus pervaded

in

radio broadcasts, the Reich-

public places. Propaganda also

all stations of human life, invading

even innermost feelings.
When the air war
particularly sharply and

in Vienna began, the propaganda machine reacted
began with renewed urgency to deal with the new
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situation.The goal was
created by the Allied

to motivate the

bombing, and thus,

citizens to overcome the conditions
prevent the

break-down of morale,

and turn psychologically against the enemy, which would strengthen
support for the war effort and contribute to the ultimate victory.
By 1944, the Viennese population's reaction

to Nazi propaganda was

rather negative.^ After veiled reports of Nazi military defeats, including
knowledge of the rising death toll of soldiers and civilians, the majority of the
population

began to realize the probability of defeat. Two important myths of

the Viennese had been shattered: first, the belief in the technical superiority of
German war material, and secondly,

the hope for a quick victory.

It was also

apparent by now,

that "Austro-Fascism" had lost its original appeal. As an

Austrian politician

pointed out later:*3 "Austrian Fascism has always embraced

only a small minority of the Austrian population. It would have never been able
to grab political power based on the democratic constitution and by lawful
means. That's why it violated the constitution and used violence."244 While this
last statement can be regarded as hypothetical, the world war to fight the Nazi
system with all its ramifications was more apt to turn the Austrian citizens
against fascism.
An SD-report315

of March 10,1944, at a time when only the sporadic

beginnings of the bombing of Vienna had taken place, recorded a pessimistic

Karl Stadler. Oesterreich 1938-1945. Im Spiegel der NS Akten. (Vienna: Herold,1966) , p
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Heinrich Schneidmadl, "Gruener Weg in die braune Hoelle." Sozialistische Hefte 1 0,
(Octoberl 946) : 19.
2
" Austrian Socialists actively fought Nazism: ibid, p 3.
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mood: "The bombing attacks contributed to the war weariness and fatalistic,
destructive tendencies of citizens in Vienna's workers districts . . . The belief in
a final victory is present in only a very few.
The population was more concerned

by then with the bombing from

above rather than the barrage from within and so mostly ignored the
propaganda. Instead, people displayed the stoic cooperation of disillusioned
and cautious pragmatists, as they

went about their day-to-day struggle for

survival. "At that point of the war," Karoline Ledinegg says,*7 "we were so used
to this kind of

'brainwashing,'

the endless repetition of

all these slogans

seemed merely rhetoric. They were considered empty phrases and could only
inspire real believers."
Regardless of the indifference of the population, the Party members were
relentlessly drilled

to influence the population "positively:"^ In a special order

for the purpose of educating the leadership, titled "Discussion evenings of the
NSDAR" and signed by Martin Bormann, the Nazi members were advised:

It is necessary for the NSDAP to spark continuously the fierce
determination and cooperation of the nation . . . The Party has to
be fanatic and enthusiastic, instinctively and politically smart, and
has to influence through [the members ] personal actions even the
small things and events of every-day life.

In these sessions, party members were encouraged to counteract, —"in
the hours of emotional and nen/ous stress"— every utterance of weakness, of

2<c

Oecterreich 1938-1945. pp 341.
Interview, Ledinegg.
^ RBI. 10/1943. 2/19/1943, box 378, State Archives.
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doubt or distrust, with expression of faithful trust in

the leadership. There was

an interesting addendum:

It is not important whether each party member present who has
anything to say, gets to speak; important for the outcome of this
evening is the fiery diction of the speaker as well as the common
belief in the requirements of the total war.

Propaganda certainly reverberated in the work place. Karoline Ledinegg
reports that one of her bosses, a proclaimed Nazi, always used with conviction
a multitude of slogans, such as i2"9
"The front fights and wins, the homeland works and sacrifices!"
"Whoever does not follow the air protection rules is a national parasite."
"The cooperation of the woman in air protection is a national duty."
"He reminded

us every day," says Karoline Ledinegg,

"what women

were supposed to do, for example, to collect scrap metal for making a birthday
gift to the Fuehrer;
pleasantly and

but my collegues and I mostly ignored him; we just nodded

went about our business. But, generally, and in all public

situations, people didn't dispute phrases like these; they knew better than that."
Still, it seems that this kind of propaganda indeed contributed to the
uplifting of

the bomb-weary citizens' spirit. It gave them a certain

security, which often comes with repetition, despite
diction, like "sacrifice," "duty," and "parasite."

feeling of

the sometimes grim Nazi

But there were people who had

different experiences with propaganda; open non-conformity or rejection of

248

Interview Ledinegg. She says that she still remembers these slogans word for word, since
her boss would acquire them by reading regularly at his desk the Kleine Wiener Krieaszertuna . a
propaganda-run paper.
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slogans could result in Nazi persecution,

even though sometimes nothing

happened. "I never participated in any of the campaigns, Karoline Ledinegg
says, " and I was never questioned about it."
But unfortunately, there were "more pernicious ways in which an ever
increasing number of people were tortured or executed without trial or sentence
for no worse crime than
Freiheitskaempfer

unorthodox opinions."235

Der Oesterreichische

reported that after the air attacks in Vienna-Favoriten,21

which was according to SD-reports a particular trouble spot,

machine guns

were positioned against the population. "In spite of it, no actions of resistance
against the 'brown pest' and its war were activated," the report states, " it was
because of the paralyzing fear of

Nazi terror. The citizens also feared "small

terror," the type which punished with "small" penalties, such as the curtailing of
necessities provided by the government, and punitive assignments."22
When Goebbels tried to "convince the mass of German people that their
only hope of saving the Fatherland and themselves lay in giving unconditional
obedience to the Fuehrer and unconditional resistance to their enemies," it only
intensified their wish to survive on their own means. The fear of retaliation for
nonconformity was perhaps the primary reason why there was never any open
resistance to the Nazi regime. But there were

other factors. Under the

desperate straits of the bombardment, as destruction multiplied,

people

became more dependent than ever on the government for their very essentials.
So, instead of rising in revolt against the authorities, as the Allies had at one
time hoped, the citizens
250

found themselves bound to support a regime which,

Hannah Vogt, "Life in the Third Reich," p 69 of Hitler and Nazi Germany.
Considered a typical workers' district.
From Der Oesierreichicsche Freiheitskaempfer. Oesterreich 1 938-1 945. p 342.
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after all, preserved order and continued to supply them with food, clothing and
other necessities. How could they sabotage the war effort without doing the
same to their very own existence?253

Furthermore, amidst the hardships and

severe conditions of the bombing, they feit strongly that any internal revolution
at this stage would only bring chaos.
Finally

it may be asked, how could people sabotage any kind of war

effort that could be of utmost importance to the survival of their own flesh and
blood (husbands and sons) fighting in the field and at
bombing period,

civilian morale was a question

the front? During the

of great concern, not only to

Nazi propagandists, but also to American bombing strategists. Each
attempted to manipulate it in its

side

favor, in opposite directions. While Nazi

propaganda wanted to win the war by sustaining

the people's morale,

American bombing strategists put their faith into bombing as a way of "busting"
morale.
Some American strategists hoped
German

population

that the bombing would make the

feel so miserable, they would rebel against their

government and overthrow it.

They argued that

. . if coordinated with major

military defeats or mounting military losses, massive bombing might destroy
German morale. If the Germans could be brought to realize that total victory
would forever elude them and that they themselves would now begin to suffer,
the Nazi regime could crumble from within ... a sudden disintegration of the
enemy always remained a distinct possibility . . . "S6 However, military planners
considered

it even possible at one time in 1943 that to the contrary "bombing

"3 The Struggle for Europe pp 150-1.
The Struggle for Europe, p 150.
255
Robert Keyseriingk, Austria in Worid War II. An Anglo-American Dilemma. fKingstonMontreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988) .,^129- 130.
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might actually strengthen the civilian fighting spirit.

And even if civilian moraie

would be destroyed, it would not help to get rid of Nazi control."Z6
One post-war analysis supported that prediction: "Air attacks only
hardened the Germans' will to resist: German domestic morale did not crack
and fighting continued longer than thought possible, " and: "Nazi and Allied
victories and defeats came about through conventional -- military means rather
than through political warfare."257 The captured American pilot Claude Parker,
describing "the stark terror created by the 'cuckoo'" and how he couldn't help
"seeing with his own eyes the utter confusion, the chaos, the disruption in the
lives of people living in Vienna . . ."25B corroborates this conclusion, maintaining
that despite the destructiveness and the attempt to use the bombings

as the

means to undermine the spirit of the population, the morale of the people was
never broken.
Nazi propagandists, in the meantime, worked hard to brainwash the
population and keep their spirits up by broadcasting special radio reports with
emphasis on speeches of the Fuehrer, as well as of the Minister of Propaganda
and other Nazi officers. Regular reports from the front painted conditions in a
much better light than was warranted, and dripped of optimism and grandiose
illusions, as well as derision

of the enemy. For years after the war was over,

Franz Liszt's "Les Preludes," which the Nazis had chosen as the musical theme
for broadcasting

256

front reports, evoked mixed emotions among the people.
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There were also newspapers, the public speeches in parks and squares, even
peculiar reflection hours ("Feierstunden"):2*

A national-socialist 'Feierstunde' in the Burghof ended our Reichs
meeting. Recitation, choir singing and music reflected not only the
seriousness of our times but also the confidence one could read in the
eyes of each of the young Fahnenjunkers, [flag boy] who will soon again
stand before the enemy, with greater and more responsible functions. At
the peak of the celebration hour, three "Ritterkreuz"-bearers of the army
read messages of great army leaders to the youth of Grossdeutschland,
conveying to them not only gratefulness, but also encouragement for
renewed persistence.

Propaganda

posters demonstrated

particularly well "the art of Nazi

manipulation."260 Making reference to the American "enemy" bombardment, they
were intended to encourage the suffering population to carry on. The posters
were produced by the Nazi regime in cooperation with the high command of the
Wehrmacht.
terror;"

"Life goes on and work goes on," said one, "despite the bombing

another shewed the picture of destroyed streetcar tracks with the

caption: "Streetcars will operate here again tomorrow!" A third
toddler in front of a destroyed apartment house, tended to by an

showed a
agent of the

NSV, proclaiming: "Bombed out alright, but fed nevertheless."
The propaganda theme of the "citizen as an important war effort
contributor" had sometimes almost comical results. "The Vienna Symphony in
the war effort,"a6' was the dramatic headline with which the press announced
the Vienna

;

Symphony's closure. The revered musicians

"Kleine Wiener Krieqszertuno December 6.1944. p 3, c 2-3.
° Exhibition items # 261, Military Museum.
September 22,1944, p 3, c 1.

, 0

were

praised

for
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having exchanged their musical instruments for weapons and

for offering

themselves for the war effort.
Propaganda also reached into the mundane as well as the utterly private
affairs of the citizens, in order to keep them focused on the war goals as well as
the party ideals. What better way was there than to play on the emotions of
people when they were the most vulnerable? Christmas celebrations in military
hospitals were given special attention; after all, recovered soldiers were still
needed at

the front.

Martin Borman ordered

these celebrations to observe

strict rules, and guidelines on the involvement of the party were to be obtained
from the Main Culture Office of the Reichspropaganda Headquarters.22 The only
things that were not regulated were the Christmas cookies; they were allowed
to be baked, with no particular specification, in the hospital kitchen.
Invading people's lives, Nazi government regulations

reached as far as

death. A peculiar order addressed even wreath arrangements and eulogies tor
deceased officials:253
(1) A wreath with ribbon was to be provided by public money.
(2) A band was to be affixed with a black swastika on white background.
(3) The band was to be placed "in an efficient manner" to the lower parts
of the red ribbon, so that there would be room for a dedication.
(4) The dedication was to be written uniformly in silver script.
(5) The cost had to be "moderate," not to exceed 20 Reichsmark in the
months of May to October, and 30 Reichsmark from November to April.
As the regime became more aware of the impatience, disillusionment
and ever growing disgust
262

of the population, it attempted to

direct hatred

R.BI., Order # 416/44, NSDAP, Party Office, recalling specifics from nr. 60/43, 11/13/1943;
box 151, National Archives.
263
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towards the air attacks of the Americans, calling them in ine press

"air attack

gangsters" and "bomb terrorists" who used churches as their "military targets."264
Common sense told the Viennese citizens that it was actually the Nazi regime
that had gotten them not only into the war, but also by its refusal to surrender,
into the air war. Rather than hate the Americans,
population resigned themselves to the fact

despite all the mayhem, the

that this bombing might actually

help to get rid of the regime.
Nazi propaganda motivated the non-believers
important issue

of all

which was to

to focus on the most

remain alive; eventually this terrible war

was going to be over. As the war progressed, particularly as the bombardment
became a daily ordeal, the

citizens relied more and more on their own

spirituality; the distaste for the Nazi regime seemed to boost iheir own skills of
resources and brought out their resilience and hardiness.

Kiffine Wiener Krieqszertung. November 17,1944, December 6,1944, October 19,1944.

CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

The morale of the German people, both at home and at the front, is
sinking ever lower . . . The people thinks [sic] that it is facing a
perfectly hopeless situation in this war . . . The people will
continue to do their duty and the front-line soldier will defend
himself as far as he has a possibility of doing so. These
possibilities are becoming increasingly limited however, primarily
owing to the enemy's air superiority. The air terror which rages
uninterruptedly over German home territory makes people
thoroughly despondent. One feels so impotent against it that no
one can now see a way out of the dilemma.265

With the final siege of Vienna in April

1945, the city came

closest to

chaos. This condition, the aim of the Allied air war, came about only in the final
hours, when Soviet troops approached Austria from the East.
On Good Friday, March 30th, 1945, the distant booming of guns could
already be heard, as

Soviet troops under Marshall Tolbukhin had come close

to the Austrian-Hungarian

borders The next day,

railroad yards were

bombarded as well as all Danube bridges and important intersections. The
aerial bombings, which were still continuing, --the last attack occurred on April
3, 1945- caused extensive fires in so many places that the fire brigades could
not be in all

locastions

at the same time anymore. The Viennese population

moved into cellars and began a stint of ten days of underground living. As the
Soviets entered Vienna, on April 6, 1945,

fiercely fighting

remnants of Nazi

forces in the streets, all bureaucratic and commercial life on the "outside"

gss Final Entries, d 138. entry on March 12, 1945.
266 Finale, pp 202-6.
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had

102
completely

ceased. Martial law was established. The Gauleiter of Vienna,

Baldur von Schirach, now also Defense Commissioner, quickly declared the
city a fortress and

called up the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth for a last

defense. Fourteen- and fifteen-year old boys were told to dig foxholes and
defend themselves with panzerfausts.257 He himself finally fled the city. His wife
describes the Schirach family's exit in her later memoirs: "Driving away, ! looked
back like Lot's wife. All I saw was burnt homes, miserable streets; and it was
snowing."26s
On April 7, 1945, Goebbels' entry in his diary, reads: "In the East Vienna
is the critical point. The enemy has reached the city area on the south-west. . .
The south-eastern section of Vienna is already largely in his hands."269
Had the American Air Force achieved its stated goals? Militarily, a
number of goals were met:
the destruction of Vienna as a railroad and transportation center,
the destruction of Austrian oil facilities and industries,
the final prostration of the southeast post of the German Reich.
However, the

psychological part, that of breaking

the morale of the

people was not achieved. All sources have maintained that "German domestic
morale did not crack."270
Even as Vienna
amount

267

lay finally prostrate on the ground, -the estimated

of debris was 850,000 cubic meters, resulting from the destruction of
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close to 4,000 buildings—27

ths moral© of th© psopl©, though low at times, was

never broken. Their sense of respect for authority, which led them to accept a
certain regimentation in order to increase their chances of
with a combination of

survival, together

common sense, stubbornness and resilience, had

helped them to survive.
By early April, the Strategic Air Command had begun to run out of
suitable targets in Germany.272 Western German ports, especially Hamburg, and
their surrounding industries had received terrific and repeated poundings.
Berlin had taken an almost daily pounding, and throughout the whole Reich the
Air Force had blasted industries, transportation,

airfields, and port facilities

along the Baltic. The German Air Force was no longer a menace, much of
Germany had ceased to be enemy territory, and the need for further destruction
had finally passed. On April 16, 1945, General Spaatz terminated the strategic
air war against Germany.
It should not surprise anybody that the American Air Force military
command felt, that they had done a good job and considered their mission
accomplished; the Allied bombing, in their assessment, was a success. And it
was, of course, from a military viewpoint, expressed in the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey which

came to this

conclusion about the final

chapter of the war:

Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. Hindsight
inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or
better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive ... Its power

271

Finale, p 226.
A. Russell Buchanan. The Untied States and Worid War II. Vol. II (New York: Harper &
Row,1964), p 451.
272

104
and superiority made possible the success of the invasion. It brought
the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual
collapse, although the full effects of this collapse had not reached the
enemy's front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces. It
brought home to the German people the full impact of modern war
with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the German nation will
be lasting.273

Even though this statement, by its nature, was meant to sound forceful
and convincing, a few thoughts about its accuracy are in order. Whether the
employed air power was decisive or not may be subject to various strategists
and experts' opinions; it can be argued, however, that to the contrary, "air
attacks only hardened the Germans' will to resist:274
The final sentences of

the Strategic Bombing Survey's conclusion

cannot be disputed: the war's horror and suffering left a lasting imprint on the
Austrians, but not only in terms ot their psyche. It lasted many years before the
physical damage was repaired, but the citizens' resilience, practiced and honed
in the stricken years of war, helped to build the country anew.
The author Bischof speaks of an "Austrian spirit,"275 which, he says, was
never "extirpated," but only grew and contributed to a surprising outcome. As a
result of both the offensiveness of Nazi propaganda on one hand, and the trials
of the American bombing on the other, which might have acted as a kind of
catharsis, when everything was over,

a new

kind of nationalism emerged

which, in the post-war era, helped Austrians form a new government and start
anew as an independent nation. As early as April 27, 1945, only days after
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Vienna's

capture by the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front under Tolbukhin,276

before the official date of surrender,277
extraordinary happened:

a

provisional

and

something rather surprising and
Austrian

government

under the

presidency of Karl Renner was formed. If there ever was any doubt as to the
condition of the population's morale, the fact that Austria was able to establish a
new,

Allied-sanctioned government so quickly, even before the official end of

the war,

showed that spirit was high. It is proof of the premise that the city of

Vienna and its population had persevered.
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